the US would abandon its interests in Southeast Asia entirely, just
that the US, as a global power, might be prepared to make way for
China as regional hegemon in Southeast Asia, even while retaining a
more substantial presence in Northeast Asia. Southeast Asia, in other
words, cannot rely on American power indefinitely.
Given its geographical position and regional economic interests,
Japan might prove a more tenacious competitor, though it suffers
certain historical disadvantages. Japan has never been prepared meekly
to accept the Chinese world order. The competition that might have
developed from the seventeenth century for influence in Southeast
Asia was curtailed by Japanese isolationism. After the Meiji restor-
ation of 1867, pent up Japanese national energies were channelled into
rapid modernisation, the fruits of which were turned against China.
Japanese aggression from 1895 to 1945 sowed seeds of deep distrust and
resentment, not just in China, but throughout Southeast Asia. Fear of
the resurgence of Japanese militarism, and the ugly side of Japanese
nationalism, not to mention a lack of cultural affinity and Japanese
racial arrogance, present barriers to the extension of Japanese influ-
ence in Southeast Asia. In view of these difficulties, Japan may well be
content to rest its power on its global economic interests rather than
attempt to compete politically with China in Southeast Asia. Even so,
Japanese investment in, and aid to the region would be likely to con-
tinue as a welcome economic counterweight to China.
How might Southeast Asian nations respond to a more assertive
China? Any answer to this question must take account of the histori-
cal and cultural context of Chinese–Southeast Asian relations. One
point to note is that as the history of the relationship has shown,
Southeast Asian kingdoms faced with the preponderance of Chinese
power never concluded alliances to ‘balance’ it. Balance-of-power
thinking that comes so naturally to Western international relations
analysts^7 was never the way Southeast Asian kingdoms traditionally
dealt with China. Only in the last fifty years, as a result of Western
dominance in the region, have balance-of-power coalitions been
Future directions