augmenting Chinese influence in Southeast Asia that possession of
the Spratlys would offer. Only a negotiated settlement that met some
of the claims of Southeast Asian nations would indicate that Beijing
had a more benign agenda. What might a negotiated settlement offer
China, given that the PRC would have to surrender part of the
archipelago? The primary benefit would come from the reassurance it
would give to Southeast Asian nations that China really did want
peaceful and friendly relations. ASEAN states would be grateful, and
ready to accommodate China in other ways. They would treat China
with due deference as the regional great power. But there would
be more. China would still stand to gain control of a good part of
the South China Sea and its resources. A settlement would still
project Chinese power far to the south and place China in a stronger
strategic position. So China would still end up exerting greater in-
fluence in the region.
Would these benefits, substantial as they are, be enough for
Beijing? Or is China determined to become the undisputed regional
hegemon in its pursuit of global great power status? If so, China will
reject all ASEAN attempts to negotiate a settlement of the South
China Sea and, instead, pursue its long-term strategic goals, with all
that entails for the countries of Southeast Asia.
Conclusion
In summary, the situation appears as follows. Changes are underway in
the strategic balance and security environment in Southeast Asia as
China’s power increases. To this both the US and Japan must respond,
as well as regional states. The US and Japan may oppose the rise of
China, or make way for it. But whatever the two major powers do, con-
tinental Southeast Asian states will never be part of a
balance-of-power coalition to contain China; and maritime states will
be reluctant to join for fear of dividing ASEAN. Southeast Asian
Future directions