Essays in Anarchism and Religion

(Frankie) #1

46 Essays in Anarchism and Religion: Volume 1



  1. For some insightful comments to this effect see Garry Wills’s
    chapter on Day in Certain Trumpets: The Nature of Leadership
    (New York: Touchstone, 1994).

  2. Roberts, Dorothy Day and the Catholic Worker, 83.

  3. In his autobiography, the Catholic Worker Ammon Hennacy re-
    counts an interaction in which Day argued this point to a group of
    skeptical anarchist interlocutors. Day, Hennacy writes, “felt that man
    of his own free will accepted God or rejected God and if a man chose
    to obey the authority of God and reject the authority of the state it
    was not unethical to do so.” Autobiography of a Christian Anarchist
    (New York: Catholic Worker Books, 1954), 129.

  4. McKanan, The Catholic Worker after Dorothy, 22.

  5. McKanan, The Catholic Worker after Dorothy, 23.

  6. As McKanan writes, “Remarkably, no individual and no commu-
    nity presumed to step into the leadership vacuum that had been left
    by Dorothy Day. Yet perhaps it would be better to say that almost
    everyone did so: because so many individuals and communities took
    personal responsibility for some of the tasks needed to sustain a vital
    movement, there was no need for a central leader or bureaucratic
    structure to take charge of all of those tasks. In the last years of its
    founder’s life, the Catholic Worker movement became what Dorothy
    Day had always said it was: an organism rather than an organization.
    And as such it has endured.” The Catholic Worker after Dorothy, 28.

  7. Piehl, Breaking Bread, 243.

  8. On both the question of domination and the question of moral
    authority, McLaughlin’s argument in his Anarchism and Authority:
    A Philosophical Introduction to Classical Anarchism (Aldershot, UK:
    Ashgate, 2007) is in tension with the idea of exemplary leadership
    and authority I have developed here. McLaughlin insists upon un-
    derstanding authority as a “dominative power,” entailing “the right
    of A to issue directives and the correlative duty of B to follow them.”
    (54) While McLaughlin recognizes that authority can exert a kind of
    “normative” power, according to his definition it is always accompa-
    nied by an act of submission and obedience, which is what gives it the
    character of domination. Still, it is hard to make sense of his rather
    blunt contention that anarchists “reject moral authority,” a conclusion

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