Given DODD 3000.5 and recent SSTR experiences,
the U.S. Army had ample drivers to become a lead-
er and early adopter as it started incorporating this
broader understanding of fragility into doctrine. In
2008, U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-07’s Stability
Operations Framework was oriented upon the “Frag-
ile States Framework” that defines a fragile state as a
country that suffers from institutional weaknesses
serious enough to threaten the stability of the central
government ... aris[ing] from several root causes,
including ineffective governance, criminalization of
the state, economic failure, external aggression, and
internal strife due to disenfranchisement of large sec-
tions of the population. Fragile states frequently fail
to achieve any momentum toward development [and
can] generate tremendous human suffering, create
regional security challenges, and collapse into wide,
ungoverned areas that can become safe havens for ter-
rorists and criminal organizations (HQDA 2008, 1-10).The U.S. Army and USAID view fragility as a
broad “continuum” or “spectrum” of failed, failing,
and recovering states. They have adopted definitions
for fragility which not only include the narrower state
fragility concept but likewise embrace the broader so-
cial fragility construct. Their scope is mission focused
yet retains enough flexibility it can help operationalize
a sustainable security framework in a manner that is
useful in dealing with realities of 21st century security
challenges.
U.S. Government, DOD, and Army Relevance
Over the last few years, the conceptual discourse on
fragility has been moving from the realm of academic
research to practical application. During this matura-