tendencies that he had contracted from his opposition to his professors.
In that sense, it would replay the work of Roquentin, whose diary
performed a similar therapeutic function. But the problem of authenti-
city had been percolating in Sartre’s mind for years. No doubt it was
advanced by Heidegger’s use of the termEigentlichkeit, usually translated
as “authenticite ́” in French and “authenticity” in English.^9 Once Sartre
becomes “Sartre,” and Heidegger begins to take notice of him, the
German will insist that, unlike Sartrean “bad faith,” his “authenticity”
carries no moral significance. Sartre will reply that the very opposite
is the case: Sartrean “bad faith” is merely a form of self-deception
without moral bearing whereas Heideggerian Eigentlichkeit clearly
carries a positive moral value for its author.^10 Despite protests, it became
widespread to ascribe moral significance to each term.
From the random observations on “authenticity” spread throughout
theWar Diaries, we discover features that will be incorporated into a
more robust concept of the term elsewhere.^11 Indeed Marjorie Grene has
described “authenticity” as the “sole existentialist virtue,”^12 and Charles
Taylor, though scarcely an existentialist, in his excellent book on the
concept has warned anglophone ethicists not to neglect this dimension
of the moral life.^13 Three features emerge from Sartre’s use of the term
in theWar Diariesthat will serve as ingredients for his subsequent
uses of the expression: truth to oneself (which later becomes “good
faith”), affirmation of one’s being “in-situation,” including one’s histor-
icity (the human condition as inescapably immersed in history), and
(^9) In addition to his Berlin year when he read a portion ofBeing and Time, Sartre would already
have encounteredauthenticite ́in the excerpt of Henry Corbin’s translation ofQu’est-ce que la
metaphysique?published inBifurno. 8 (June 1931 ), where his own “Le ́gende de la ve ́rite ́”
appeared, though Beauvoir claimed that “since we could not understand a word of it we failed
to see its interest” (Prime 92 ). She also remarked that in 1932 “Sartre worked out the notion of
dishonesty [mauvaise foi] which, according to him, embraced all those phenomena which other
people attributed to the unconscious mind” (Prime 153 ). We’ve noted the appearance of of
“mauvaise foi” inEmotions( 1939 ). In the Heideggerian context,Eigentlichkeitis usually
rendered as “ownmost” or “most properly one’s own” (seeBeing and Time, trans. John
10 Macquarrie and Edward Robinson [New York: Harper & Row,^1962 ]; hereafterBT).
Sartre remarks that “the expressions ‘authentic” and ‘inauthentic’ which [Heidegger]
11 employs are dubious and insincere because of their implicit moral content” (BN^531 ).
See below,Chapter 9 ,onAnti-Semite and JewandWhat is Literature?, as well asChapter 10
12 forNotebooks for an Ethic.
13 Majorie Grene, “Authenticity: An Existential Virtue,”Ethics^62 (July^1952 ):^266 –^274.
Charles Taylor,An Ethics of Authenticity(Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press, 1991 ).
166 The war years, 1939–1944