Environmental philosophyencountered in trying to develop environmental codes of conduct. None is
entirely convincing, but many have something interesting to offer. If any
conclusion can be drawn from these debates, it is that perhaps too much
emphasis has been placed on the need for a robust case for intrinsic value
or for rights. There may be most mileage in those intermediate approaches
that recognise the existence of inherent value in non-human forms – from
which it can then be argued that, whilst non-human entities may not have
rights, humans do have duties not to do certain things to them. Whatever
position is adopted, the advantage of a broad definition of ecologism is that
it includes a wide range of perspectives, all of which seek to generate a
higher ecological consciousness that ‘will turn the tables in favour of the
environment, such that the onus of persuasion is on those who want to
destroy, rather than those who want to preserve’ (Dobson 2000 : 59).
There are alsopoliticaladvantages in adopting this broad definition if it
helps open up environmental philosophy to a wider audience. One inference
frequently drawn from the conventional dichotomy is that ecocentrism rep-
resents the boundary of ecologism. Much ink has been spilt discussing this
point, often in the form of a polarised debate about doctrinal purity – about
being ‘greener than thou’ – reminiscent of the fratricidal conflicts associ-
ated with other ‘isms’ such as socialism and feminism. Ecocentrics tend to
dismiss other positions for being insufficiently ‘deep’ and, in so doing, have
claimed the moral high ground: ‘After all, who would embrace a shallow
view of any subject which one genuinely cares about, when a deeper view
is available?’ (Goodin 1992 : 43). Such exclusive attitudes are harder to sus-
tain if it is accepted that a pure ecocentric position is untenable and that
awider range of ideas can be incorporated within the ambit of ecologism.
The inclusion of intermediate perspectives does not denude ecologism of
its radicalism; rather, deep ecology would colonise the most extreme eco-
centric wing of a broad church encompassing a wide range of philosophical
and political positions. After all, the boundaries of all ideologies display a
Plasticine-like quality, being both malleable and movable, as illustrated by
thebreadth of different positions within socialism (from Marxism to social
democracy).
However, an ideology also needs a coherent political dimension. Eco-
centrics are criticised for being more concerned with getting the philoso-
phy right – by, for example, elevating the anthropocentric–ecocentric debate
into a litmus test for greenness – rather than developing a practical polit-
ical programme for change (Taylor 1991 ;Barry1999a; Dobson 2000 ). In so
farasecocentrics do think ‘politically’, they emphasise the need to change
individual consciousness, with a heightened awareness of our proper place
in nature as the preferred path to ecological salvation (e.g. Devall 1990 ).
This interest in personal transformation is reflected in an apparent lack of
interest in wider issues of political change in society. The message seems to
be: ‘if you cannot change the world, change yourself’ (Barry 1994 : 390). The