Environmental philosophy7 Ethical holists, such as Rolston and Callicott, can be placed in the intermediate
category (Box2.3)anyway,because they explicitly or implicitly concede ultimate
moral superiority to humans (Vincent 1993 ). The question here is whether
‘ecocentrics’ also fall back on anthropocentric arguments.
8 Other prominent deep ecologists include Drengson ( 1989 ), Mathews ( 1991 )and
McLaughlin ( 1993 ).
9 There is some slippage in Fox’s use of the concepts of the ‘self’ and
‘identification’. Plumwood ( 1993 :176)detects three ‘shifting, and not always
compatible’ types of self – indistinguishability, expansion of self and
transcendence of self – a lack of clarity that contributes to confusion.
10 The ethical holists are extensionists in so far as they seek to extend moral
consideration based on intrinsic value, but their reliance on holistic arguments
distinguishes them from the animal liberationist focus on individual living
entities (Vincent 1993 ).
11 The term ‘animal liberation’ is preferred to ‘animal rights’ because the latter
may be used in a narrow sense to refer to rights-based approaches (e.g. Regan),
whilst the former also includes utilitarian perspectives (e.g. Singer).
12 Regan actually uses the term ‘inherent value’ where here ‘intrinsic value’ is
preferred (see Box2.1).
13 The discussion focuses on those issues with most relevance to the development
of an environmental ethic. For a broader discussion of animal liberation issues,
see Clark ( 1977 ), Benson ( 1978 ), Midgley ( 1983 ), Benton ( 1993 ), Gruen ( 1993 )and
Garner ( 2005 ).
14 Singer ( 1979 :ch.3) does distinguish between pain and death. Whilst ‘pain is
pain’ and pain of similar intensity will be equally bad for all sentient creatures,
the various ‘superior’ capacities for self-awareness and so on mean that the life
of humans is more valuable than that of those creatures which do not possess
those capacities.
15 Recent research, for example, has shown a chimpanzee picking up a sticken
routetorooting out a termite nest, and an orangutan using a piece of cardboard
topick a lock on its cage (Goodall 1986 ). See also Benton ( 1993 ).
16 Goodin ( 1992 )argues that only humans can impart value to nature, but the
characteristics of nature that give value ‘must necessarily be separate from and
independent of humanity’ (p. 45).
17 Goodin recognises the obvious conflict between the idea of humans being part
of nature and the concept of naturalness. He argues that we cannot expect
nature to be ‘literally’ untouched, rather it should be touched ‘lightly’ or
‘lovingly’ (Goodin 1992 : 53). He illustrates this idea of the ‘modesty of creation’
bycomparing a small English village with Los Angeles, where humanity has
ridden roughshod over nature.
18 Raztalks of ‘derivative’ intrinsic value, which roughly corresponds to the
definition of ‘inherent value’ used here and he uses ‘ultimate value’ where
‘intrinsic value’ is used here.
19 Here value eclecticism bears some similarity to Brennan’s ( 1992 ) case for ‘moral
pluralism’ – that we should ‘think in terms of a plurality of values, and an
associated plurality of principles’ (p. 27) – and draws on some of his arguments.