they diVer on matters unimportant to most voters—then bicameralism will channel
legislative debate and bargaining toward inessential issues, perhaps marginalizing
the legislature. If, on the other hand, diVerences in preferences across chambers span
a cleavage highly salient to citizens, then legislative bargaining will focus onWnding
compromise along that dimension of conXict. This insight suggests a qualiWcation
of the claim often advanced by advocates of deliberative democracy that open
debate is, in itself, a public good. It may be, if it is aimed at achieving mutually
acceptable outcomes on salient issues, but otherwise it may trivialize the deliberative
forum. With respect to institutional design, moreover, the nature of incongruence
between chambers in a bicameral system—that is, how diVerences in the
composition of the two chambers map onto conXicts in the electorate—may help
explain whether legislative checks are politically productive, or even relevant.
7 Conclusion
.........................................................................................................................................................................................
The purpose of this chapter has been both to outline what we know, and to
organize some ideas about comparative legislative organization so as to direct
attention to speciWc things we do not yet know, or that we do not know with
suYcient certainty and empirical authority, but that would help us understand the
extent to which legislatures fulWll their normative potential within democratic
systems. In identifyingWve broad sets of expectations to which legislatures are
subject, I am suggesting a normative case for strong legislatures. Assemblies
that meet these expectations are heavyweights in their respective policy-making
environments.
The claim that strong legislatures are desirable rests on the potential to exploit
their plural nature in areas where it implies a comparative advantage relative to
other types of institutions—in representing diversity, providing transparent
debate, dividing labor, and proWting from specialization, generating and revealing
information—and to strike a workable balance between deliberateness and
decisiveness. This chapter reviews scholarship that sheds light on the conditions
that aVect whether legislatures realize these expectations, and highlights some
promising avenues for future research. SpeciWcally, I suggest that studies of legis-
lative electoral systems should recognize the trade-oVbetween collectivist and
individualistic representation as distinct from, and frequently more important
than, that between proportional and single-winner systems. I suggest that in
order to understand legislative accountability, we need to pay closer attention to
the transparency of deliberation—who can monitor legislative actions and who has
450 john m. carey