undermines a crucial factor in the original regime concept. As Mossberger and
Stoker comment:
If regimes are simply coalitions that bring together actors in a complex policy environment,
but where the division between market and state is not a factor, then how do urban regimes
diVer from networks? This alternative concept isXexible, and has many forms, without
specifying that it bridges the divide between popular control of government and private
control of the economy. (Mossberger and Stoker 2001 , 824 )
What is lost by this adaptation of the regime term is its political economy focus.
Network is an excellent generic term for partnerships between sectors, but urban
regime is driven by an understanding of what operating in a capitalist society
implies for governing as well as an appreciation of the institutional dynamic that
can also condition and direct that process of governing. It may be true that in
London, and in Europe more generally, business participation in regimes is less
central than in the United States but partnerships that exclude business cannot be
accurately included within the original concept of urban regime. Putting a new
label such as policy in front of the term in the end hampers the eVort to aggregate
research and to test and reWne existing theories.
MisclassiWcationconsists of ignoring important diVerences and clustering to-
gether unlike phenomena. The problem stems from a misunderstanding of regime
theory and in particular the mistaken view that all cities must have regimes. But as
a careful reading of Stone’s work makes clear, the establishment and maintenance
of a regime over an extended period of time is an unusual occurrence.
As Mossberger and Stoker argue:
The privileged position of business fosters the conditions for the development of regimes at
the local level in all capitalist countries, although local job creation may be more of a
concern in some countries, and local tax revenues in others. Despite this, it is clear... urban
regimes are intentional partnerships, and are diYcult to maintain because participants have
divergent as well as overlapping interests. Regimes, with their varied agendas, represent
political choice. Whether or not a regime exists in a particular place is an empirical
question, and it entails a speciWc set of relationships, including the ability to build
public–private cooperation around a chosen agenda. (Mossberger and Stoker 2001 , 815 )
The problem comes when all coalitions are claimed to be regimes. Kantor, Savitch,
and Haddock ( 1997 ) in their cross-national comparative study, for example, char-
acterize Liverpool during the 1980 s as a ‘‘radical regime’’ ( 1997 , 358 ), although it
clearly lacked the prerequisites of public–private cooperation in pursuit of a
common agenda. In Liverpool, the Militant Tendency of the Labour Party was
more interested in resisting central government and business interests than in
building collaboration with local business. Indeed it did not develop partnership
with voluntary and community sector organizations either. It had a rather narrow
focus on power held within the local state. Whatever else the Militant Tendency was
doing, they were not building an urban regime. The problem lies in the typology
comparative local governance 507