PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION: A contemporary introduction

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ARGUMENTS AGAINST MONOTHEISM 139

seems no reason whatever to think them true. This much of Rowe’s case
seems impeccable.
Animal suffering is a highly plausible candidate for an evil that is either
imaginably but not contextually pointful or unimaginably pointful. Is it
true regarding animal suffering that if it is imaginably but not contextually
pointful, or unimaginably pointful, then animal suffering is actually
pointless? The Rowean critic takes the answer to be affirmative. The
monotheist is likely to disagree. Who is right?
The proper answer to the “Who is right?” question rests on the sort of
connection it is reasonable to think holds between an evil E being
imaginably but not contextually pointful or else unimaginably pointful
and E being actually pointless. Are our relevant cognitive powers reliable
enough, and our relevant knowledge great enough, for us to say that an
evil’s having the first of these properties is good evidence that it also has
the second of these properties? The Rowean argument in favor of thinking
that our cognitive powers are reliable, and our information sufficient, goes
as follows.
We often have to make judgments in cases in which we would like more
information. Nonetheless, our only choice is to follow the best reasoning
we can find and accept the results. If it is true that:


1 For all we can tell, it is true that P;
2 We can find no evidence in favor of not-P,


it is proper to infer to


3 It is reasonable to believe that P, and unreasonable not to do so.


In accord with Professor Rowe’s intention, we might call reasoning of the
sort that 1–3 represents Common Reasoning. The relevant application of
this reasoning is:


4 For all we can tell, it is true that animal suffering has no point.
5 We can find no evidence in favor of animal suffering having a point.^24


So it is proper to infer to:


6 It is reasonable to believe that animal suffering has no point, and
unreasonable not to do so.


Granted, either an evil has a point or it does not. Whether it does or not
is independent of whether we think it does or not. There is no proposal
that evil E’s having a point and our being aware of E’s point are related

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