PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION: A contemporary introduction

140 ARGUMENTS: MONOTHEISTIC CONCEPTIONS

by entailment, natural law, or the like. But, the Rowean claims, the
reasoning in 4–6 exemplifies the pattern exhibited by 1–3, and this
pattern of reasoning is rightly of high repute and common use. Not to
apply it to whether animal suffering has a point is tantamount to
rejecting reasoning all of us apply all of the time. Such a strategy
smacks of inconsistency, dishonesty, and special pleading, none of which
is the way of true philosophy. So:

(2*)If there are imaginably but not contextually pointful evils then
there are actually pointless evils ( = Evils that are not
contextually pointful are actually pointless)

and

(2**) If there are unimaginably pointful evils then there are actually
pointless evils ( = Evils that are unimaginably pointful are
actually pointless)

triumph.

For all its apparent force, this argument fails. The question as to
whether animal suffering has a point is the question as to whether God,
if God exists, might have a morally sufficient reason for allowing it.
Suppose the reasoning exhibited in 1–3^25 fits perfectly any such case as
this:

4a For all we can tell, it is true that Bill’s allowing his animals to
suffer has no point.
5a We can find no evidence in favor of the view that Bill’s allowing
his animals to suffer has a point.^26

So it is proper to infer to:

6a It is reasonable to believe that Bill’s allowing his animals to suffer
has no point, and unreasonable not to do so.

We can also argue:

4aa For all we can tell, Bill’s animals are suffering.
5aa We can find no evidence that Bill’s animals are not suffering.

So it is proper to infer to: