148 ARGUMENTS: MONOTHEISTIC CONCEPTIONSlogically necessary condition of G’s obtaining,^34 and (ii)
G’s obtaining is of sufficient worth to justify E’s being
permitted in order to make G possible.If one takes this to be the proper definition of has a point then only evils
that are logically necessary conditions of goods can have a point. The
scenario offered concerning religious maturity seems logically consistent.
If so, then this definition of has a point is too narrow. We need instead the
more complex:
Definition 3: Evil E has a point if and only if (a) there is some good
G such that (i) E’s obtaining is a logically necessary
condition of G’s obtaining, and (ii) G’s obtaining is of
sufficient worth to justify E’s being permitted in order to
make G possible or (b) there is some good G such that
(iii) God can bring good G out of E’s occurrence, and (iv)
G’s obtaining is of sufficient worth to justify E’s being
permitted, whether or not E is a logically necessary
condition of G.
It would be helpful here, no doubt, to offer plausible, fleshed-out
examples of what sort of state, virtue, or experience saintliness might
amount to, or at least sketchily described description, perhaps in terms of
a durable disposition toward self-giving love, a tranquil and charitable
character expressed in improving people’s lives, or a continuing sense of
the presence of God. For a Jew, the suffering of the Jewish people no
doubt is relevant here, and for a Christian the suffering of Christ. But
conceptually and empirically, these are beyond this author. I simply note
the relevance of such matters to a nuanced account of the problem of evil.
I also note that the occurrence of the sort of saintliness roughly
characterized here is of great importance to the monotheistic religious
traditions. It is the sort of character that genuine faith, worship, and
monotheistic religious experience is supposed to bring the believer to, if
only in the long run.
One misplaced criticism should be noted. The discussion here does
not assume, contrary to the critic’s own beliefs, that there are such
states or experiences in the offing, with God ready to supply them. The
point is simply that when one is considering propositions that are, if
true, then necessarily true – such as The Actually Pointless Evil Claim
(that God would not allow pointless evil) – one is not only entitled but
required to consider what the possibilities are. If there are possibilities
that would not be possible if a proposition P were a necessary truth,
then P is not a necessary truth (and if P is, if true, then a necessary