ARGUMENTS AGAINST MONOTHEISM 163(EE) If we follow (E) in cases where we are not inferring from an evil
being inexplicable to our being justified in claiming that it actually
has no point, we should follow (E) in that case as well.
The critic is assuming this: (N) Necessarily, if God has a morally
sufficient reason for allowing E, then E has an actual point, because the
critic infers from Some evil has no actual point to God does not exist
via the claims that If an evil exists which God would have no morally
sufficient reason for allowing, then (since God would allow no evil
without having a morally sufficient reason) God does not exist. Thus,
on the critic’s view, (EE) is identical to:
(EE) If we follow (E) in cases where we are not inferring from an evil
being inexplicable to our being justified in claiming that God has
no morally sufficient reason for allowing it, we should follow (E*)
in that case as well.
Whether something like (EE) or (EE) is true depends on whether there
is some relevant difference between cases in which it is reasonable^56 to
follow them and the case in which we infer from an evil’s inexplicability
to (our being justified in) thinking it has no point. In applying (EE) or
(EE), we are taking ourselves to be in a position to infer that an
omnicompetent being has no morally sufficient reason to allow an evil
from the fact that we cannot think of what such a reason might be. It
hardly seems unreasonable at least to suspend judgment about the
applicability of (EE) or (EE) to this sort of case, however wedded we are
to its applicability in cases involving no such considerations. There
seems, then, no reason to think it rationally inappropriate at least to
suspend judgment regarding the applicability of (EE) and (EE) to the
sort of cases that a Rowean argument requires us to apply it. If this is
so, we’ve no reason as yet to accept the conclusion of that argument.
A slightly different Rowean attempt goes like this. Consider this
definition:
Evil E has a rationale if and only if God brings about, or per-
mits, E to obtain in the light of some morally sufficient rea-
son that God has for so doing.Then we can form the Rowean argument:
Ra There are many evils whose rationale, if any, is unknown to us even
after our most careful reflections.