PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION: A contemporary introduction

(avery) #1
ARGUMENTS (2) 269

T2 If nirvana experiences have occurred, that fact is evidence that We
are composed at a time of momentary elements and over time of
bundles of such elements is true. So:
T3 That fact is evidence that We are composed at a time of
momentary elements and over time of bundles of such elements is
true.^1


Further, in treating these appeals to experience in the same sort of way
as we treated appeals to numinous experience, the first premise of each
triad must be read phenomenologically; thus we will have:


A1Moksha experiences (in which one at least appears to realize one’s
identity with qualityless Brahman) have occurred.
J1
Kevala experiences (in which one at least appears to realize one’s
existential independence or ontological security and one’s
omniscience) have occurred.
T1* Nirvana experiences (in which one at least appears to realize one’s
nature as composed at a time of momentary elements and over
time of a series of bundles of such elements) have occurred.


These will replace A1, J1, and T1, and the beginning (the antecedent) of
A2, J2, and T2 will be modified accordingly. The central question then is
whether it is true that:


A2 If moksha experiences (in which one at least appears to realize
one’s identity with qualityless Brahman) have occurred, this is
evidence that one is identical to qualityless Brahman.
J2
If kevala experiences (in which one at least appears to realize
one’s existential independence or ontological security and one’s
omniscience) have occurred, then this is evidence that one is
existentially independent or has ontological security and one is
omniscient.
T2* If nirvana experiences (in which one at least appears to realize
one’s nature as composed at a time of momentary elements and
over time of a series of bundles of such elements) have occurred
then this is evidence that one is composed at a time of momentary
elements and over time of a series of bundles of such elements.


If one or more of these is true, then there is some principle of
experiential evidence that plays the same role relevant to A2, J2, and
T2* as our earlier principles do relative to similar claims concerning
numinous experience. Is there any such principle?

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