278 NONMONOTHEISTIC CONCEPTIONSquality or state X of S, then S’s having E is evidence that S is
in state, or has quality, X.Experiencing pain, euphoria, or anxiety is evidence that one is in a state of
pain, euphoria, or anxiety.^10 Religious claims do not typically concern such
private, momentary psychological states, and no religion bases its core
doctrines on their occurrence. Being identical to Brahman or being
qualityless, being indestructible or a soul that exists independently, and
being a momentary being or a being whose constituents are momentary are
not features or qualities or states that are experience-dependent. If
someone has any of them, she has them whether she experiences herself as
having them or not. Thus the principle
(P***) If a person S has an experience E which, if reliable, is a matter
of S being aware of an experience-dependently existing
quality or state X of S, then S’s having E is evidence that S is
in state, or has quality X
is not the proper principle of enlightenment experiences. The qualities
the relevant religious beliefs ascribe to people are not experience-
dependent properties.
One might try instead:
(P****) If a person S has an experience E which, if reliable, is a matter
of S being introspectively aware of being in an experience-
independently existing state X of S, then S’s having E is
evidence that S is in state X.
This principle raises the question of whether it is possible to be
introspectively aware of an experience-independent property. The notion
of introspection is not lucid. It is not obvious what the range of
introspection is – not clear what is and is not a possibly introspected
quality or state. One’s cognitive states – e.g., one’s thinking about
squares or wondering where to look for a new blowfish – are known by
introspection. So are one’s psychological states – being depressed about
the demise of one’s old blowfish but relieved that one’s guppy is healthy
again. Whether or not one is in pain is learned by introspection. If one
wants “introspection” to refer to a particularly reliable state, then one
will count feeling cold and feeling in love to be introspective states, but
not being cold or being in love, since one can feel cold though one’s body
is warm or feel like one is in love when one but suffers a short-lived
infatuation that vanishes at the first sign of inconvenience. Thus, in
keeping with the idea of so characterizing introspection that it is a