280 NONMONOTHEISTIC CONCEPTIONS(P****) If a person S has an experience E which, if reliable, is a
matter of S being introspectively aware of being in an
experience-independently existing state or quality X of
S, then S’s having E is evidence that S is in state, or has
quality, X
will not do. Experience-independently existing states or qualities, on the
construal of introspection on which it is particularly reliable, are not
possible objects of introspection.
One might instead suggest something like:
(P*****) If a person S has an experience E which, if reliable, is a
matter of S being non-introspectively aware of being in
an experience-independently existing state or having
an experience-independently possessed quality X of S,
then S’s having E is evidence that S is in state, or
possesses quality, X.
The question that (P*****) raises is whether a subject/content
experience can be non-introspective and yet be direct evidence for
someone being in an experience-independent state or having some
experience-independent quality. Sensory experience and monotheistic
religious experience are subject/consciousness/object, not subject/
content.^11 The requisite sort of experience would be direct evidence that
one was in an experience-independent state or had an experience-
independent quality and yet be a subject/content experience.
An experience of the kinesthetic sort in which one is aware that one is
moving or of the position of one’s body is not subject/content – it is
awareness of one’s body moving or being in a certain position. Feeling a
tingling in one’s fingers is also subject/consciousness/object. These
sorts of experiences, like sensory experience of physical objects other
than one’s body and introspective experience, won’t provide an analogy
for the sort of experience that would provide evidence for the religious
beliefs of enlightenment traditions.
One who holds that enlightenment experiences provide such evidence
will contend that such experiences are unique in kind. Thus the failure
to find similar experiences is not surprising or problematic. The idea is
that enlightenment experiences just are awareness of one’s being
qualityless, one’s being indestructible, or one’s being momentary or
composed of momentary constituents. The problem with this suggestion
is that these states or qualities are not directly observable. Nothing can
be qualityless; that would effectively get in the way of its existing. One
could discern the momentariness of something else, but one would have