48 PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGIONdiscussed in a later chapter), at least this much seems clear: if any of
Experiences 1 through 4 are veridical, then there is a self-conscious being
of impressive holiness whose presence elicits a tendency to worship.
Consider, then, this instantiation of Criterion 2:
Criterion 2a: Experience A is of a different sort from experience B if:
(i) A is veridical, there is a self-conscious being of
impressive holiness whose presence elicits a tendency to
worship, whereas it is false that if experience B is
veridical then there is a self-conscious being of
impressive holiness whose presence elicits a tendency to
worship.^6
Consider next the descriptions of Experiences 5 through 8. Here one finds a
focus on such psychological features as peace, calm, and freedom from
desire, and the association with these features of a claim to have reached
the last of one’s rebirths and an achievement of nirvana – technically, of an
experience now that is alleged to guarantee that one “goes to nirvana”
when one dies. These experiences, by Criterion 2a, are of a different sort
from Experiences 1–4. Further, they do not claim exactly an awareness of
nirvana; the link between experiences with the psychological features
mentioned comes through the acceptance of certain doctrines that provide
the backing for a claim to the effect that (N) If one has experiences of a
certain psychological sort under certain conditions, then one has achieved
enlightenment. The evidential force, if any, of Experiences 5 through 8
rests on the status of the doctrines that provide the backing for (N).
This, in turn, illustrates a point of some importance. An experience can
provide evidence for a claim directly, as my seeing my computer screen
does for the claim that my computer screen still exists. An experience can
provide evidence for a claim indirectly, as in the case in which observing
squiggles in a cloud chamber provides evidence that electrons are passing
through the chamber. Here, there is a theory that says that under certain
conditions, there will be observable squiggles in the chamber that are best
explained as caused by electrons – or, if you like, observing the squiggles is
observing the electrons. Either way of putting things depends on there
being a theory connecting observation (perceptual experience) to claim
(that there are electrons present). In cases of indirect evidence, the evidence
is only as good as the theory that links experience to claim.
Experiences 9 through 19 include descriptions of psychological states
similar to those given of Experiences 5 through 8, but there is an
interesting additional feature. There is a report to the effect that the
subject can “see” his own past lives and a remarkable range of things
besides – in effect, that the subject has become at least something like