The Economist March 19th 2022 15
BriefingThe war in Ukraine
“R
emember pearl harbor,” Volody
myr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president,
entreated America’s Congress. “Remember
September 11th...Every night for three
weeks, in various Ukrainian cities, Russia
has turned the Ukrainian sky into a source
of death.” Mr Zelensky was not asking for
pity. He was asking for a nofly zone or,
failing that, for arms. “I have a dream. I
have a need. I need to protect our skies,” he
pleaded—surely the first man to invoke
Martin Luther King Jr in pursuit of surface
toair missiles.
Shortly before Mr Zelensky began his
speech on March 16th, Russian television
broadcast an address given by Vladimir Pu
tin, his counterpart. Where Mr Zelensky
appealed to his listeners in the name of all
Ukrainians, Mr Putin set Russian against
Russian. “Fifth columnists and traitors,”
he snarled, would be spat out “like midges
that flew into [the Russian people’s]
mouth”. The need for cleansing Russia of
such “scum” was evoked with disconcert
ingly familiar fascist rhetoric. “I am con
vinced that such natural and necessary
selfpurification of our society will only
strengthen our country [and] cohesion.”
The war, the dictator insisted, was “go
ing to plan”. If that is his opinion then his
minions are keeping him from the truth.
According to American defence sources,
10% of Russia’s invasion force has been
lost, presumably either killed or wounded.
It is shy at least 233 tanks, 32 surfacetoair
missile launchers and 41 planes, drones
and helicopters, according to Oryx, a blog
which tracks such weapons using pictures
made public on the internet. On top of that
which has been destroyed, a fair bit of
workable Russian kit has been captured—
much of it towed away gleefully, and on
video, by farmers with tractors.
These are severe losses of men and ma
teriel. What is more, they seem to have fall
en disproportionately on elite units such
as the vdvairborne forces, Spetsnaz spe
cial forces and the First Guards Tank Army,
an armoured force purportedly both well
trained and equipped. British defence in
telligence says that these losses are so se
vere that they have left Russia “struggling
to conduct offensive operations”. It has
been forced to redeploy forces from its
eastern military district (which stretches
to Vladivostok), from its Pacific fleet and
from Armenia; it is also recruiting Russian
and Syrian mercenaries.
This is a high price for what are, as yet,
relatively scant gains. In the east, Russia is
stuck at the outskirts of Kharkiv, a city it
tried and failed to take on the war’s first
day. In Sumy, northwest of Kharkiv, Rus
sian tanks have been spotted lodged in the
mud—a problem that will only grow as
Ukraine’s spring thaw gets going.
Russian forces are firmly positioned 15
20km to the northwest of the centre of Ky
iv and 2030km to the east of it, and other
suburbs around the capital are being laid
waste. More and more rockets and missiles
have been hitting the city.
But that fire has been returned. Ukrai
nian artillery is being dug in around the ci
ty and mobile missilelaunchers deployed.
Supermarket shelves are far from full but
food has not run out. The water, electricity
and gas utilities are still working. Morale
remains high. “I have never so much as
K YIV AND MYKOLAIV
The war is not at an impasse, but it may be moving that way
No end in sight
→Alsointhissection
17 The risks of escalation