The Economist March 19th 2022 27
EuropeGermany
Ploughshares to swords
V
ladimir putin’swar feels close in Ber
lin. Take the escalator in the Haupt-
bahnhof(main train station) down one lev
el, cross the floor and you find its victims:
hundreds of refugees seeking a room for
the night or a ticket for onward travel. On
some days over 10,000 Ukrainians reach
Germany’s capital. Reception centres are
struggling. But the volunteers swarming
the concourse have been heroic. The extent
of their organisation is “almost shocking”,
beams Zeren Yildirim, a volunteer with the
International Rescue Committee.
No less shocking has been the foreign
policy switch engineered just across the
river Spree in Germany’s chancellery. On
February 27th Olaf Scholz delivered a
speech to the Bundestag that will be re
called as one of the defining moments of
his stillyoung chancellorship. Mr Putin’s
unprovoked invasion of Ukraine marked a
Zeitenwende (“turningpoint,” or “water
shed”), Mr Scholz said. The term has come
to stand for what may become one of the
biggest ruptures in German foreign and se
curity policy since the second world war.
In just under half an hour Mr Scholz
reeled off a headspinning list of an
nouncements. Germany would lift defence
spending to the natotarget of 2% of gdp
(up from 1.5% in 2021). It would establish a
€100bn ($110bn) fund for the Bundeswehr
(the German armed forces) and place it in
the constitution to elude Germany’s defi
citlimiting “debt brake”. To reduce depen
dence on Russian energy it would make
good on longdiscussed plans to build two
liquefied natural gas (lng) terminals. Mr
Scholz vowed to work with France to build
combat jets, to equip the Bundeswehr with
armed drones and to replace the ageing
Tornado planes used to carry American nu
clear weapons stationed in Germany. If the policies turned heads, so did Mr
Scholz’s language. Vowing to “defend every
square metre of natoterritory”, the chan
cellor linked Germany’s investment in mil
itary capabilities to its values of freedom
and democracy. He said Germany must act
for its own sake, rather than just helping
allies. He jabbed at his country’s instinct to
place negotiation above everything else in
the diplomatic toolbox. “Not being naive
means not talking simply for the sake of
talking,” he said. Germans are not used to
hearing their leaders speak like this.
As so often in German politics, the dam
had broken with dizzying speed. A few
days before his speech Mr Scholz in effect
killed Nord Stream 2, a Russian gas pipe
line that allies had long argued would en
trench German reliance on the Kremlin.
Germany succumbed to partners’ entreat
ies to eject some Russian banks from the
swift internationalpayments system.
Most difficult for some, the government
swallowed its objections to arming Uk
raine, and agreed to send 1,000 antitank
weapons and 500 surfacetoair missiles,
among other things. More is promised.
Mr Scholz had shared the full details of
his plans with only a small coterie of advis
ers. Few expected a chancellor known for
caution to react so decisively—and to con
sult so narrowly. Some mps were put out.
“In my understanding of our constitution
al republic, things like this should be dis
cussed in parliament and inside the co
alition before being decided,” says SaraB ERLIN
A risk-averse Germany reluctantly enters an age of confrontation
→Alsointhissection
30 PresidentMacronandthe war
30 FascisttalkinRussia
31 Thecatsanddogsofwar
— Charlemagne is away