Saddam Hussein9, expressed as "Somewhat, Definitely, Very, and Extremely," are
applied in table 18.1 to half-standard-deviation intervals above and
below the mean score of the norming group for each VICS index.
The VICS scores for Hussein's philosophical beliefs in table 18.1
show that he views the nature of the political universe (P-i) as very
hostile, almost one and a half standard deviations below the average
leader. He is also very pessimistic about the prospects for realizing
fundamental political goals (P-2). Hussein sees the political future
(P-3) as extremely low in predictability, and he believes that he has
an extremely low degree of control over historical development com-
pared to others (P-4). Finally, Hussein's assessment of the role of
chance in politics is extremely high (P-5).
The VICS scores for Hussein's instrumental beliefs in table 18.1
indicate that he believes that a definitely conflictual direction is the
best strategy (I-i) in the political universe, coupled with definitely
conflictual tactics (1-2). His general risk orientation (1-3) is very low;
that is, he is more averse to taking risks than other leaders. The Iraqi
leader's propensity to shift between cooperative and conflict tactics
(I-4a) is extremely high, and his propensity to shift between word
and deed tactics is very high (I-4b). The utility of means indices
(1-5) show that his reliance on threats is extremely high, along with
a very high reliance on oppose/resist tactics. Hussein's reliance on
both reward and punish tactics is somewhat high; however, his
reliance on promises is extremely low compared to other leaders. He
is average in his propensity to use appeal/support tactics.
Overall, the key VICS scores for Self and Other in table 18.1 indi-
cate that Hussein believes in a definitely conflictual approach to
strategy (I-i) and attributes an extremely low level of control (P-4a)
to himself in the political universe. He sees the political universe as
very conflictual (P-i) and attributes an extremely high level of con-
trol (P-4b) to others in the political universe. These dual images of
Self and Other and an extremely high propensity to shift between
conflict and cooperation (I-4a) suggest that his strategies and tactics
will be relatively flexible and perhaps erratic.
The standard deviation scores for the key indices in table 18.1 also
allow us to locate Hussein in Holsti's revised typology of operational
codes and extrapolate some predictions about his likely strategic and
tactical interaction patterns. The strategies and tactics in the four