Hussein's complexity scores during the coalition counterattack
were very interesting. There was a dramatic drop during the early
days of the air attacks against Iraq and its forces, followed by a sub-
stantial increase after the attacks had continued for over a month
with no widening of coalition actions. When the ground war began,
there was another large drop. This pattern demonstrates that opposi-
tion initiatives, even devastating ones, failed to make Hussein
become more flexible or submissive in the short run. Instead, they
strengthened rigid adherence to his established course. However, as
the damage to his forces continued to mount, and as his defenses
increasingly proved ineffectual, he may have begun to search for a
compromise solution. The coalition ground attack preempted such a
solution; his reduced level of complexity at that point may have indi-
cated a hardening of his position. Another explanation for the
episodes of lowered complexity is that they reflected disruptive
stress; but if so, Hussein's recovery was remarkably rapid.
In either case, a pattern of resilience may be related to Saddam
Hussein's remarkable ability to survive opposition. It may also iden-
tify conditions under which he does or does not engage in attempts
at complex problem solving. New actions against him, rather than
motivating him to search for compromise, buttress a unidimensional
strategy; more cognitive investment in a differentiated and inte-
grated viewpoint occurs when it becomes obvious that the simple
strategy is unavailing. Perhaps most telling in this regard is the fact
that he found the psychological resources for increased complexity
toward the end of a period during which overwhelming coalition air
power was rapidly demolishing his capital city and his armed forces
almost without resistance.
Hussein's complexity rose again after the cease-fire was put into
effect. This may reflect the ending of a major period of stress (Sued-
feld, Corteen, and McCormick 1986; Suedfeld and Granatstein
1995). It may also be related to his recognition, as an effective cog-
nitive manager, that at this point he did have to engage in serious
planning and negotiation to salvage his own political survival out of
a total military defeat.
A recurring concern in complexity studies is whether the level
of complexity found in the material reflects actual cognitive
processes or mere rhetoric designed to present a preferred image of
