54 China The Economist March 26th 2022
millions in a famine of his own making,
bitter political struggles within the party
and at least one attempted coup. Deng
Xiaoping retained authority well after his
retirement, despite public resentment of
his bloody suppression of the Tiananmen
Square protests of 1989 and open criticism
of his policies by conservatives in the party
who saw them as a catalyst of the unrest.
Similarly Jiang Zemin, who had overseen
mass layoffs from stateowned firms (an
gering millions of workers as well as con
servatives), wielded much power long after
he retired from his last post in 2004.
Mr Xi’s bid for an extension of his rule
must anger some in the party. Cai Xia, a for
mer academic at the party’s most presti
gious training centre for officials (she now
lives in America), has accused Mr Xi of
forcing the party to “swallow dogshit” by
ordering the Central Committee in 2018 to
approve a constitutional revision to facili
tate his bid. But there is little sign today of
the kind of turbulence in elite politics that
marked the buildup to Mr Xi’s anointment
as party chief in 2012. That year saw near
open feuding involving a prominent polit
ical rival, Bo Xilai, a member of the Polit
buro whom Mr Xi later accused of being in
volved in a plot to seize power.
Purges have continued. An 18month
“rectification” campaign of the domestic
security forces ended late last year, aimed
in part at rooting out those disloyal to the
party and Mr Xi. Its most powerful targets
included a deputy minister of public secu
rity, Sun Lijun, who was accused of leading
a “political cabal” within the police (he was
formally charged with corruption in Janu
ary), as well as Fu Zhenghua, a former min
ister of justice. On March 21st it was an
nounced that a former vicepresident of
the supreme court, Shen Deyong, was un
der investigation for unspecified crimes.
But there is no sign of any open cam
paigning for power of the type that Mr Bo
engaged in. Mr Xi’s relentless onslaught
against corruption—sometimes a smoke
screen for attacking his political ene
mies—has sown such fear within the party
hierarchy that it is hard to imagine any
such challenge today. Barriers to organis
ing against him are “near insurmount
able”, wrote Richard McGregor and Jude
Blanchette in a report on postXi succes
sion scenarios that was published last year
by the Centre for Strategic and Internation
al Studies in Washington and the Lowy In
stitute in Sydney.
On his management of the pandemic,
Mr Xi is showing no sign of wavering. “Per
severance is victory,” he said at a meeting
on March 17th of the Politburo’s seven
member Standing Committee. He called
for a “stepup” in mobilisation and “unre
mitting efforts” to combat the current
wave of outbreaks. Mr Xi also said that
“maximum” effort should be made to min
imiseharmto theeconomyandsociety.
Butsimilarphraseshavebeenusedbyoffi
cialsbeforeoverthepasttwoyears.
Crucially,therehasbeenlittlesignof
anyletupinthepunishmentofofficials
forlettingcovidspreadontheirwatch.The
SouthChinaMorningPost, a newspaperin
HongKong,hascountedmorethan 70 who
havebeensackedorreprimandedduring
thiswave.The experienceofHongKong
mayencouragemainlandofficialstostay
vigilant.Thenumberofcasesdetecteddai
lyinthatcityfarsurpassesthetotalonthe
mainland.DailydeathsinHongKonghave
risentoabout 200 comparedwitha hand
ful,ifthat,intherestofChina.Astheysee
it,HongKong’splightistheresultofnot
pursuing azerocovidpolicythoroughly
enough.Theynotethatitlacksthekindof
manpowerthemainlanddeploystoensure
compliance(seenextstory).
Atthismonth’sparliamentarymeeting
MrLi,theprimeminister,admittedthego
ingwouldbetough.Thisyear,hesaid,Chi
nafacedan“obviousincreaseindangers
andchallenges”.Butheendedhisspeech
withhisusualinjunction:“Wemustunite
evercloseraroundthepartycentrewithXi
Jinpingatitscore.”Itwouldtakedaringto
dootherwise.n
Thepandemic
The footsoldiers of
zero-covid
T
he thirdfall was the one that finally
put Gao Ying in the hospital. As a com
munity health worker, she had been help
ing Hangzhou, her home city, fight a surge
in covid19 cases. She had not slept in her
own bed for two weeks. She was exhausted.
Still, on March 18th she set off for a meeting
on local covidcontrol measures. That’s
when she collapsed three times in a lift, the
third time smacking her head on the wall.
Video of the incident was captured by a
cctvcamera and shared on social media.
Ms Gao’s tireless efforts were in re
sponse to an outbreak that most countries
would consider trivial. Hangzhou, with
12m people, had recorded just 54 symp
tomatic cases of covid in the two weeks be
fore her fall. (Ten more were asymptomat
ic.) Overall, China has logged around
27,000 new local symptomatic cases in
March, fewer than America recorded most
days this month. Still, it is the biggest out
break in China since the early days of the
pandemic (see chart on next page). And it
is straining the country’s “dynamic zero
covid” policy, which aims to stamp out the
virus with mass testing, extensive contact
tracing and strict lockdowns. Those efforts
involve millions of workers like Ms Gao.
Technology, such as tracking software,
helps. But much of the work involves clip
boards, telephones and barricade tape. An
important role is played by some 110,000
neighbourhood committees—legacies of
the Mao era, when they helped China’s
Communist Party keep order. Each com
mittee has between five and nine mem
bers, as well as many volunteers. Today
they keep tabs on residents, help enforce
lockdowns and organise testing.
A neighbourhood committee member
might, for example, ask a person who has
just travelled from another city to take a
test or stay inside for a few days. During
targeted lockdowns of, say, a housing com
pound, they control who gets to go where.
(Security guards and China’s 7.7m foodde
livery workers are also important during
these times.) Smaller cities, of 5m people
or fewer, are supposed to be able to test
everyone in just two days. That involves a
lot of doortodoor visits by committee
members, as well as volunteers who organ
ise people in queues.
Contact tracing, in particular, is labour
intensive. The city of Shanghai alone has
3,000 workers devoted to the effort. Most
are publichealth officials. During out
breaks they can be on call 24 hours a day.
Some sound a little worn out. “In a week of
continuous battle with the virus, everyone
stayed up all night several times, pushing
our bodies to the limit,” says one. “So
please can everyone who receives a call be
patient and cooperate.”
If some people are frustrated with the
state’s zerocovid footsoldiers, it is per
haps because there are so many of them—
and they don’t always coordinate. A per
son might receive a call from several differ
ent officials: one from where they work,
another from where they live and yet an
other from where they have been recently.
B EIJING
A weary army of workers is battling the
virus in China
Counting contacts