Genes, Brains, and Human Potential The Science and Ideology of Intelligence

256 POTENTIAL BETWEEN BRAINS

in the form and function of many gestures produced by the chimpanzee,
bonobo, and human child. But within a few months, human infants are
developing turn- taking patterns and coordinated vocal interactions.^28
Moreover, multimodal expressions of communicative intent (e.g., vocal-
ization plus per sis tence of eye contact) that are normative even for human
children are uncommon in apes.
As a result, there are also diff erences even in gestural communication.
“Unlike the gestures of human children, the majority of ape gestures are
dyadic, intended to draw another’s attention to oneself, rather than tri-
adic, intended to draw another’s attention to an external entity.... Also
unlike most humans, ape gestures are frequently imperative (requests)
and less frequently declarative (attempts to share experience with
another).”^29
In fact, the primate mode of existence— their ecological niche— has
prob ably never demanded more than a restricted form of cooperation.
As with fi sh and birds, the primary advantage of social life in apes is pro-
tection against predators. Other wise, as Michael Tomasello has pointed
out, “the vast majority of nonhuman primate cooperation is in the con-
text of intragroup competition.” As he goes on, such a lifestyle works
“against the evolution of cooperation in these species, as individuals who
are given favorable treatment by conspecifi cs are those who are best at
competition and dominance.” Because of that, nonhuman primates lack
“shared intentionality.” As Tomasello puts it in his book, A Natu ral His-
tory of Human Th inking, they do not self- monitor and evaluate their own
thinking with res pect to the normative perspectives and standards of
others or the group.^30
Th ese views of Tomasello are an echo of the other side of Darwin, as
emphasized by Peter Kropotkin in his book, Mutual Aid: A Factor in Evo-
lution (1902). Kropotkin reminded us that Darwin did not defi ne the fi t-
test as necessarily the strongest, or individually most clever; instead the
fi ttest could be those who cooperated with one another. In many animal
socie ties, Darwin noted that strug gle is replaced by cooperation, amidst
warnings, in his Origin of Species, about the dangers of interpreting his
theory too narrowly.
Later, in the Descent of Man (1871), Darwin pointed out how, in many
animal socie ties, the strug gle between separate individuals for the means

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