MEDICINE, PHILOSOPHY, AND SOCRATES’ PROPOSALS
TO GLAUCON ABOUT Gumnastikhv IN REPUBLIC 403C–412Byuchv. Though Glaucon pays lip service to the desirability of justice by
saying he does not accept Thrasymachus’ view of it, he nevertheless shows
that he too thinks justice can only be gotten by restraining e[rw~, rather
than by redirecting and transforming it. For in book 4 he endorses both
the moral psychology and the conception of social justice articulated
there. But it is no exaggeration to say that the “just” city of book 4 is
simply a disguised tyranny justifying itself in terms of the language of
virtue, the very thing that Thrasymachus unmasked in book 1. Thrasy-
machus’ account of justice may be a de facto true account of many poli-
ties, but it is diffi cult not to share Socrates’ sense that Thrasymachus’
account does not tell the whole story about justice. The “just” soul of
book 4 is the mirror image of a Thrasymachean polity. It represents
indeed that unjust life, disguised as a just life, that the naive and ambi-
tious Glaucon fi nds tempting. Or at best it is a model of what Aristotle
will call the merely continent but non-virtuous soul. For it maintains its
unity by means of strict control of e[rw~ and qumov~ by a passionless and
calculating utilitarian rationality.
But in later passages Socrates tries to get Glaucon to see that the
moral psychology of book 4 is mistaken. The paradoxical proposal at
the midpoint of the dialogue, from 471c to 474a, initiates Socrates’
movement from diagnosis to cure. The new proposal is that if a truly
ideal povli~ were to be realized, it would have to be ruled by philoso-
phers, the most erotic souls of all. In them e[rw~ is being redirected and
transformed and desires are becoming properly organized and aimed.
In them, strife between reason and desire is resolved by an awareness
of the Good, which makes it possible for e[rw~ to become rational and
for reason to become erotic. Whereas kings rule over cities, enshrining
their false opinions and worshiping their desires, philosophers order
and rank their desires in accordance with their knowledge (however
partial) of true goodness, and help their followers (not subjects) to do
the same. But the just povli~ is meant to be a model for the just yuchv,
with the philosopher-ruler playing the role of reason and the other citi-
zens playing the roles of the passions. So Socrates’ lesson for Glaucon
is that both the three-part povli~ and the three-part yuchv are diseased.
In the just yuchv there is no need for the passions to be controlled by any
other part of the soul. Nor in the completely just povli~ is there any need
for certain classes of citizens to be controlled by a ruling class. This new
model of povli~ and yuchv suggested by the discussion after 471c is meant
to elicit Glaucon’s recognition of the distortions in the sick povli~ and
yuchv of books 2– 5.
Socrates goes to great pains in the latter parts of the dialogue to
get Glaucon to see that the philosopher is in love with truth, and will not
tolerate the edifi ce of lies that constitutes the “just” cit y elaborated up to