5. Being and Almost Nothingness
5.1 Introduction
We appear to be ontologically committed to what I will callalmost nothings.
Examples of almost nothings includeholes,cracks, andshadows; almost nothings
thrive in the absence of“positive”entities such as donuts, walls, and sunlight. Let’s
focus on holes, since the literature on them is voluminous.^1 We quantify over holes,
and even count them: we say, for example, that there are some holes in the cheese,
seven to be precise. We ascribe features to them and talk as though they stand in
relations: that hole is 3 feet wide, much wider than that tire over there. Holes
apparently persist through time, as evidenced by the fact that my sweater has the
same hole in it as the last time you saw me wear it. We even talk as though holes are
causally efficacious: I badly sprained my ankle because I did not“mind the gap,”and
fell into the gap between the train and the walkway. We see holes in the roads and
swerve to avoid them.^2 We believe in holes. If our beliefs are true, holes must enjoy
some kind of reality.
For the ontological pluralist, there is more to learn about an object’s existential
status than merely whether it is or is not: there is still the question ofhowthat entity
exists. The ontological pluralist can happily say that there are holes and then
diligently pursue the question of in what way there are holes. By contrast, according
to the ontological monist, either something is or it isn’t, and that’s all there is say
about a thing’s existential status. This puts the ontological monist in an uncomfort-
able position. According to her, everything that there is enjoysthe same kind of
reality, which is the kind of reality enjoyed by full-fledged concrete entities such as
ourselves. She is committed to the unpleasant claim thatholes are just as real as their
hosts, a claim that is apt to be met with incredulous stares by those not acquainted
with contemporary metaphysics. Roy Sorensen (2008: 19) notes the tension almost
(^1) Lewis and Lewis (1970) began the contemporary discussion. See Casati and Varzi (1994) for a book-
length treatment. Lewis and Lewis (1996), Casati and Varzi (2004), and Sorensen (2008) continue the
discussion. But, as we will see, concerns about the ontological status of holes, privations, and the like
predate the 1970s by a considerable margin! 2
Potter (1977: 144–5) discusses the positions of various schools of Indian metaphysics on whether
absences are perceivable. Sorensen (2008: 127–9) argues that holes can be perceived, and that this fact need
not violate a causal theory of perception.