In the next section, we will discuss whether essences are entities. We’ll see there
that the nature of essences has implications for whether true essentialist claims about
an object entail the existence of this object.
9.4 Are Strict Essences Entities?
In section 9.1, I blithely construed strict essences as collections of properties. Now I’ll
be more careful about their nature and their ontological status. Should we construe
strict essences as entities, and if so, what kinds of entities are they? Are they identical
with the things that they are essences of? (Is Socrates identical with the essence of
Socrates?) Are they classes of properties or conjunctive properties? Are essences of
objects formal constituents of those objects? Are theysui generisentities? If they are
entities, do they have a distinctive mode of being? Are they fully real or only beings
by courtesy?
These questions arise if we take talk of strict essences to be talk about entities. But
contemporary proponents of strict essentialism have by and large opted to state their
essentialist claims using an operator such asit is of the essence of x thatΦ.^40 On the
face of it, the use of an operator of this sort ontologically commits one to no more
than thexto which one is antecedently ontologically committed. Therefore, it seems
that on this preferred way of expressing essentialist doctrines, talk of essences as
entities is pointless.^41
Perhaps use of an essentialist operator avoids ontological commitment, at least in
the sense that ascriptions of essences to things do not simply, as a matter of their
semantics, imply that essences are entities. But ontological commitment to essences
might sneak in the back door via two questions about essentialist statements that
employ this operator. We’ll illustrate this with a specific example. Suppose it is of the
essence of David Lewis that he is a person. What is the truth-maker for this claim?
What is the ground for its truth? Suppose that this claim has a truth-maker.
Whatever it is, it might be reasonable to call it an essence of David Lewis. Suppose
the ground for the essentialist claim is the fact thatyexists. In which case, it might be
reasonable to callythe essence of David Lewis. Only if we both formulate our
essentialist claims using a suitable essentialist operator and reject these two questions
can we dodge the question of the ontological status of essences.
(^40) Fine (1994a and 1995b) contain the classic discussion on how essentialist talk can and should be
regimented. Lowe (2013: 203) says that an essence is either identical with its bearer or it is no entity at all.
Tahko (2013: 55) says that it is better to think of essence-talk as fundamental ideology rather than as
corresponding to entities. 41
Perhaps even worse than pointless? Tahko (2013: 56) claims that all entities have essences, and
hence if essences were themselves entities, they themselves would have essences, and hence there would
be an infinite regress. But no regress looms if each essence is its own essence, which is a view Lowe
(2013: 203–5) considers, noting explicitly that such a view would not be susceptible to a regress; see also
Charles (2000: 277).