On this view, there is a distinction between essence and existence in creatures, and a
creature’s existence seems to be contingently predicated of the essence of that
creature. On this view, it seems that the essence of a thing could exist even when
the existence of that thing (and hence the thing itself!) does not exist.^77 In which case,
there would be true propositional essences grounded in the existence of thesesui
generisontic essences even in worlds in which the objects of those essences are not to
be found.
From my perspective, something like the (allegedly) Avicennian view is attractive.
For me, a mode of existence of an entity is a higher-order property or relation; it is
not a feature of that entity per se but rather of some other entity intimately related to
it. Perhaps that other entity is a property necessarily uniquely had only by that object.
Perhaps asui generisessence is nonetheless appropriately thought of (in a suitably
analogous way) as a property, and hence is also a candidate for that to which
existence is attributed. If so, then I could happily say that modes of being are
properties ofsui generisessences. And, if these properties were exemplified contin-
gently, it would seemfitting to say that modes of existence are accidents of essence.
9.5 Are There Things Whose Strict Essence is
Exhausted by their Mode of Being?Traditional metaphysics distinguished two questions one can ask about a putative
entity. Thefirst question is the question of existence: is there such an entity? The
second question is the question of essence: what is the essence or nature of that
entity? These questions seem to be distinct questions, at least if there are no modes of
existence. However, we are in a context in which we are distinguishing different
manners in which things exist, and in which we are allowing that things belonging to
different ontological categories have different modes of being. (In section 4.4, we
explored whether ontological categories just are fundamental modes of being.) In
which case, facts about whether an object is and what its ultimate nature is might not
be distinct after all.
The notion of a strict essence is subject to few conceptual constraints. As far as
I can detect, there is no immediate conceptual incoherence in positing that there is an
entity E and mode of being B such that the total propositional essence of E consists in
E’s enjoying the mode of being B. There might be theoretical reasons to reject
putative total propositional essences that include information about existence in
them, and we will explore one of them later in this section.
Butfirst let’s examine two candidates for being an entity whose essence includes
its existence.
(^77) Gilson (1952: 75–8) holds that Avicenna thought essences had a kind of being in themselves, as well
as being in things and being in minds, and this is why they can exist independently of things or cognitions.
See also Kenny (2005a: 45–6) and Perszyk (1993: 69–70).