turns on whatever differences there might be between concepts, propositional func-
tions, or properties, let’s focus on the view that existence is a property of properties.
Although the doctrine that there are ways of being is consistent with the Kant–Frege
thesis, it is not committed to it. As noted in section 1.5.3, the friend of ways of being
might hold instead that existence is afirst-order property of individuals. Moreover,
existence might not be a perfectly natural property but instead might be similar to
a mere disjunction of more natural first-order properties, the ways of being.
However, as also noted in section 1.5, one could believe that things exist in different
ways without believing that there are ways in which things exist. There are (at least)
two ways to coherently formulate the doctrine that things exist in different ways:
one that takes the notion of ways of existence ontologically seriously, and one that
does not. It will be occasionally convenient to focus on the ontologically serious
formulation, but most of what matters in what follows could be recast in terms
acceptable to the nominalist. Similarly, the friend of ways of being might agree with
the Kant–Frege thesis that existenceandmodes of existence are second-order
properties, or she might hold instead that they arefirst-order properties.^16 It will
occasionally be convenient to focus on the version of the view that existence is a
first-order property, but the arguments to come could be recast so as to be in line
with the Kant–Frege thesis.
2.3 Two Tests for Metaphysical Analogy
On many versions of ontological pluralism,existenceorbeingis an analogous
feature.^17 Accordingly, if wefirst determine the conditions in which we should
think that a philosophically interesting feature is an analogous feature (or even
merely disjunctive), we should then be able to determine whetherexistenceor
beingsatisfies these conditions. The key thing is that, if a property F is analogous,
then F is not a perfectly natural property and there are properties, theGs, such that
(i) each of the Gs is more natural than F and (ii) necessarily, anything that exempli-
fies one of the Gs is F. Paradigm examples of analogous properties also satisfy a third
anticipates Frege. See van Cleve (1999: 187–91) for discussion. Heathwood (2011) is also relevant,
and contains further references. Frege’s (1980b: 48–50) allegiance to the Kant–Frege thesis is substantially
clearer.
(^16) For a defense of the view that existence is afirst-order property, see Miller (2002).
(^17) Hence the name:“the analogy of being.”Some ontological pluralists, especially those who distinguish
betweenexistence(roughly, the way in which concrete things are) andsubsistence(roughly, the way in
which abstract things are), do not explicitly endorse the view thatbeingis analogous. Some of these
philosophers speak as if they do not recognize a fully topic-neutral sense of“existence”or“being.”
Nonetheless, the view thatbeing simpliciteris analogous is a natural accompaniment to such views. For
a contrary take, see Moore (1969: 372–3), who is willing to grant that particulars enjoy a mode of being not
enjoyed by universals, but holds that nonetheless the mode of being enjoyed by both particulars and
universals is metaphysically more fundamental. Thanks to an anonymous referee for directing me to this
reference.