Notes 221
Summary
As discussed in this chapter and in Chapter 7, the tenets of rational choice the-
ory, as conceived by neoclassical economics, have been seriously challenged if not
completely undermined. Th e notion of Niskanen’s self-maximizing bureaucrat
stands on weak empirical footing, as does Tiebout’s notion of the self-maximizing
citizen, albeit for diff erent reasons. Behavioral economics, as well as advances in
psychology and social psychology hold promise for advancing existing theoretical
frameworks regarding how citizens and bureaucrats behave, while the literature
on “choice architecture” attempts to show that public and private organizations
should be designed to ensure decisionmaking biases that depart from the rational
agent model do not lead to suboptimal outcomes. For decisionmakers, avoiding
the biases outlined in Chapter 7 as well as reducing temptations to maximize in-
dividual self-interest require a concerted eff ort to move from System 1 to System
2 thinking (to borrow from Kahneman 2011).
Whatever its weaknesses, rational choice has few equals in public administra-
tion theory for internal rigor and the ability to explain complex phenomena with
clarity and parsimony. Th ere are, however, clear alternatives emerging within the
social sciences. Indeed, as discussed earlier in the chapter, when applying insights
from organizational psychology, the theoretical and practical utility of Tullock
and Downs is questionable at best. A new behavioral theory is emerging, one that
is by necessity interdisciplinary. Yet the insular nature of public administration
raises concern as to whether the fi eld will be able to effi ciently incorporate in-
sights from other disciplines in this regard (Wright 2011). Th us, it is likely that
for years to come, rational choice will continue to be employed (both gainfully
and perilously) as a way of organizing and studying public bureaucracies and
public service provision.
Notes
- Although Adam Smith is best known as a founding father of economics, his ties
to public administration are considerable. Smith never held a position as a profes-
sional economist, but he undoubtedly was a public administrator—he enjoyed some-
thing of a second career as a government tax collector.