ShareofUkraineoccupiedbyRussiaas
ofApril23rdSource:theukrainemap.com
20.6%
Melitopol Mariupol
Mykolaiv
Odessa Kherson
Dnipro
Kramatorsk
Zaporizhia
Kharkiv
Izyum
Slovyansk
Kyiv
Black
Sea
Seaof
Azov
Dnieper
UKRAINE
ROMANIA
MOLDOVA
Crimea
Ukrainianterritory
annexedbyRussia
Luhansk
D netsk
Areacontrolledby
Russian-backed
separatistsbefore
Febth
Do
nba
s
150 km
ClaimedasRussian-
controlled
AssessedRussian
advances*
AssessedasRussian-
controlled
Unitmovements
Russian Ukrainian
ClaimedUkrainian
counter-attacks
Aprilth
*Russiaoperatedinorattacked,
butdoesnotcontrol
Sources:InstitutefortheStudy
ofWar; AEI’s CriticalThreats
Project; RochanConsulting
The ninth week of war: The military situation Russian casualties
Russian forces in eastern Ukraine are
slowly advancing out of Izyum, towards
thetowns of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk.
ButWestern officials say that Ukraine
isimmediately counter-attacking each
timeRussia captures a village.
Britain’s defence minister says that
a quarter of Russia’s initial invasion
force is out of action, and that 15,
Russian personnel have died. American
officials say the toll is lower; Ukraine
says it is higher.
16 Briefing Russia’s armed forces The Economist April 30th 2022
missiles were flaunted at parades in Mos
cow. Russia tested new tactics and equip
ment in Donbas, after its first invasion of
Ukraine in 2014, and in its campaign to
prop up Bashar alAssad, Syria’s dictator,
the following year.
A retired European general says that
watching this new model army fail re
minds him of visiting East Germany and
Poland after the end of the cold war, and
seeing the enemy up close. “We realised
how shite the 3rd Shock Army was,” he
says, referring to a muchvaunted Soviet
formation based in Magdeburg. “We’ve
again allowed ourselves to be taken in by
some of the propaganda that they put our
way.” Russia’s army was known to have
problems, says Petr Pavel, a retired Czech
general who chaired nato’s military com
mittee in 201518, “but the scope of these
came as a surprise to many, including my
self—I believed that the Russians had
learnt their lessons.”
The charitable interpretation is that the
Russian army has been hobbled in Ukraine
less by its own deficiencies than by Mr Pu
tin’s delusions. His insistence on plotting
the war in secrecy complicated military
planning. The fsb, a successor to the kgb,
told him that Ukraine was riddled with
Russian agents and would quickly fold.
That probably spurred the foolish decision
to start the war by sending lightly armed
paratroopers to seize an airport on the out
skirts of Kyiv and lone columns of armour
to advance into the city of Kharkiv, causing
heavy casualties to elite units.
Yet, this coup de main having fizzled, the
army then chose to plough into the second
largest country in Europe from several di
rections, splitting 120 or so battalion tacti
cal groups (btgs) into lots of ineffective
and isolated forces. Bad tactics then com
pounded bad strategy: armour, infantry
and artillery fought their own disconnect
ed campaigns. Tanks that should have
been protected by infantry on foot instead
roamed alone, only to be picked off in Uk
rainian ambushes. Artillery, the mainstay
of the Russian army since tsarist times,
though directed with ferocity at cities such
as Kharkiv and Mariupol, could not break
through Ukrainian lines around Kyiv.
Problems in profusion
In recent weeks officials and experts have
debated the causes of Russian failure.
Some have drawn comparisons to the col
lapse of the French army in 1940. But the
analogy is not apt, says Christopher
Dougherty, a former planner for the Penta
gon. “France failed because it followed bad
doctrine,” he says. “Russia’s failing in part
because it’s not following its doctrine, or
basic principles of war.”
Inexperience is part of the problem. As
the historian Michael Howard once noted,
the expertise a military officer hones “is al
most unique in that he may only have to
exercise it once in a lifetime, if indeed that
often. It is as if a surgeon had to practise
throughout his life on dummies for one
real operation.” America has been wielding
the scalpel nearly continuously since the
end of the cold war, in Iraq, the Balkans, Af
ghanistan, Libya, Syria and so on. Russia
has not fought a war of this magnitude
against an organised army since seizing
Manchuria from Japan in 1945.
Things it could do in smaller wars, in
Donbas and Syria—such as using electron
ic sensors on drones to feed back targets
for artillery—have proved harder on a larg
er scale. And things that appeared easy in
America’s wars, such as wiping out an ene
my’s air defences, are actually quite hard.
Russia’s air force is flying several hundred
sorties a day, but it is still struggling to
track and hit moving targets, and remains
heavily reliant on unguided or “dumb”
bombs that can be dropped accurately only
at low altitudes, exposing its planes to an
tiaircraft fire.
All armies make mistakes. Some make
more than others. The distinguishing fea
ture of good armies is that they learn from
their mistakes rapidly. In abandoning Kyiv,
focusing on Donbas and putting a single
general, Alexander Dvornikov, in charge of
a cacophonous campaign, Russia is belat
edly showing signs of adaptation. In early
April a Western official, when asked
whether Russia was improving tactically,
observed that armoured columns were still
being sent unsupported and in single file
into Ukrainianheld territory—a suicidal
manoeuvre. On April 27th another official
said that Russian forces in Donbas ap
peared unwilling, or unable, to advance in
heavy rain.
In part, Russia’s woes are down to