Maritime Frontiers, Territorial Expansion and Haifang 99
Conclusions: The Haifang and the Self-imposed Limits
of Maritime Expansion
Since antiquity, the Chinese had possessed a meticulous sense of
territorial boundaries. The consistent use of territorial maps and registers
of population to form tax units reβlects an unambiguous concept of
territorial jurisdiction derived from actual governance. Waterways, hills
or mountains and islands often formed the natural and visible boundaries
of geographical units. When there were no natural features to serve this
purpose, the authorities planted markers or pillars. On account of this
administrative tradition, boundaries were clearly demarcated even in
the case of maritime borders, with jurisdiction over offshore islands
unmistakably assigned to the respective local authorities to make them
fully aware of their responsibility. Although the littoral communities,
especially along the southeast coast, began to look upon the sea as their
paddy-βields and hence expanded the maritime frontier from the mid-
sixteenth century, the imperial governments made no claims to territorial
waters or lands beyond those under the administration or supervision
of civil or military appointees, or appointed native chiefs (tusi). In other
words, although inner coastal waters or harbors (ao) were seen as part
and parcel of coastal defense, there was no clear sense of territorial
waters extending beyond the coastline in im perial China. Therefore, the
sea became a natural defensive barrier rather than a means of easy access
to lands elsewhere. Occupations of the offshore islands merely served the
purpose of enhancing land-based coastal defenses. Indeed, haifang issues
attracted the attention of major authors on statecraft writing during the
period in question. While the two late imperial governments sought to
defend the seaboard against disruptions of law and order, scholars of
statecraft were able to foresee potential threats to the empire that were
emerging on the horizon.
Economic beneβits per se did not provide an impetus for maritime
expansion. Although the economic value of Taiwan was discussed by Shi
Lang, the decision to annex the island into the imperial domain was based
less on economics than on the need to strengthen the haifang. Strategic
concerns alone could justify occupation for the small offshore islands
close to the coast. However, the annexation of a distant island such as
Taiwan required both a strong strategic justiβication and sufβicient local
revenue to cover the cost of its administration.
The case of Taiwan is illuminating. It was commonly perceived as a
territory “beyond the seas”, a phrase conveying a sense of reluctance and
helplessness. Taiwan was the farthest point away from its coastline on
which the Qing government was willing to establish an overseas defense