NOTES TO PAGES 298–306 | 513
- Eric Brown, at a NEOSA Tech Week event in Cleveland (18 April 2012) (http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=bfLdgDYjC6A). - K. Jennings, ‘Watson, Jeopardy and me, the obsolete know-it-all’, TEDxSeattleU, filmed February
2013 (http://www.ted.com/talks/ken_jennings_watson_jeopardy_and_me_the_obsolete_know_it_
all); John Searle is quoted in Weber (Note 36); A. Levinovitz, ‘The mystery of Go, the ancient game
that computers still can’t win’, Wired (12 May 2014). - D. Michie (Note 27), p. 20; G. Jefferson (Note 35), p. 110 (Turing quotes Jefferson’s words in Turing
(1950), p. 451). - Turing (1950), p. 452; Turing (1947), p. 394.
- Turing (1951), p. 485; Turing (1948), p. 410; Turing (1950), p. 450.
- For Turing’s attitude to this reaction, see D. Proudfoot, ‘Mocking AI panic’, IEEE Spectrum, 52(7)
(2015), 46–7. - H. L. S. (Viscount) Samuel, Essay in Physics, Blackwell (1951), pp. 133–4; H. Cohen, ‘The status of
brain in the concept of mind’, Philosophy, 27(102) (1952), 195–210, p. 206; Turing (1950), pp. 455, 459;
Turing et al. (1952), p. 500. - Turing (1952), p. 459.
CHAPTER 28 TURING’S CONCEPT Of INTEllIGENCE (PROUDfOOT)
- The central argument in this paper is developed in D. Proudfoot, ‘Rethinking Turing’s test’, Journal of
Philosophy, 110 (2013), 391–411; see also D. Proudfoot, ‘Anthropomorphism and AI: Turing’s much
misunderstood imitation game’, Artificial Intelligence, 175 (2011), 950–7. - It is the capacity for or tendency to ‘thinking’ behaviour that is the thinking, according to the behav-
iourist. All references to behaviourism in the text should be understood in this way. - See W. Mays and D. G. Prinz, ‘A relay machine for the demonstration of symbolic logic’, Nature,
165(4188) (1950), 197–8. - See W. Mays, ‘Can machines think?’, Philosophy, 27(101) (1952), 148–62, pp. 151, 160, 151. Like Mays,
many read Turing as claiming that if the machine’s behaviour i s n’ t indistinguishable from that of the
human contestant, it doesn’t think. But Turing made it clear that an intelligent machine might do
badly in his game. - P. Ziff, ‘About behaviourism’, Analysis, 18(6) (1958), 132–6, p. 132.
- Mays (Note 4), pp. 149, 162, and 150.
- Mays (Note 4), p. 158.
- Turing (1948), p. 431.
- Turing et al. (1952), p. 495; Turing (1950), p. 441; Copeland (in The Essential Turing, p. 436) points out
Turing’s protocol for scoring the game. - Turing et al. (1952), pp. 495, 503.
- The 1952 game is played by both machine and human contestants, but only one contestant is inter-
viewed at a time. - Turing et al. (1952), p. 496.
- Except insofar as the machine must be able to produce the appropriate behaviour in real time: see
Proudfoot 2013 (Note 1), pp. 400–1. - Turing (1948), p. 411; Turing (1948), p. 431; and Turing et al. (1952), p. 500.
- Turing (1948), p. 431.
- A ‘paper machine’ is a human being ‘provided with paper, pencil, and rubber, and subject to strict
discipline’, carrying out a set of rules (Turing (1948), p. 416). - Why did Turing design a 3-player game? See Proudfoot 2013 (Note 1), pp. 409–10.
- R. A. Brooks, ‘Intelligence without reason’, in L. Steels and R. A. Brooks (eds), The Artificial Life Route
to Artificial Intelligence, Lawrence Erlbaum (1995), 25–81, p. 57. - Turing (1948), p. 412.
- Turing (1950), p. 449; Turing et al. (1952), p. 495.
- Turing et al. (1952), p. 495; Turing (1950), p. 442.