politics for the foreseeable future; at least until she is able to build up a more stable and
resilient state structure that will support democratic processes. The tensions will
undoubtedly remain, but there is a possibility to move forward.
The second observation pertains to the role of the monarchy in Cambodia and
Thailand. In both cases, personality and prestige matter more than the institution.
Cambodia is the only former socialist country to return to monarchic rule.
The reason is less ideological than practical and has everything to do with the
personality of King Sihanouk, who was the single unifying force among all Cambo-
dians. Despite limiting the power of the monarchy and providing for succession by
election rather than by inheritance, Sihanouk remained a potent force in Cambodian
politics until his death in October 2012 and his views were followed ardently. In the
case of Thailand’s King Bhumibol, a combination of a lifetime of exemplary service
and lese-majesty laws place him above the law and beyond reproach. In many ways,
both these monarchs can play and have played a serious role in the politics of their
countries, and in both instances they are seen as being above the law and the
Constitution. With one monarch dead and the other in frail health, the question
must be whether the institution of the monarchy will live long after them.
My third observation has to do with the drafting of constitutions in these states. Two
points may be made in this connection. First, new constitutions are made not merely
to rearrange and constrain political power but serve many more legitimising func-
tions, such as ushering in a new era, or establishing a regime’s democratic credentials
and right to govern. The case of Thailand is the most extreme. Having enacted and
discarded seventeen constitutions since 1932 , the drafting of a new constitution is arite
de passagefor all new regimes. It symbolises a break from the past (usually a bleak
coup-related one) and offers a blueprint for the future. Burma, on the other hand,
took more than fifteen years to draft the current constitution, which, like the Thai
example, also symbolises a break from the past, but regularises what has hitherto been
unconstitutional military interference in politics. The second point is one which
I have made previously in connection with Thailand’s constitution-making. It is
necessary to take into consideration the true centres of power in drafting a consti-
tution. The failure of so many Thai constitutions results from having not the
three traditional main branches of power that have to be constrained and regulated,
but five branches of power, when one considers the monarchy and the military.^87
(^87) See Harding and Leyland,The Constitutional System of Thailand,p. 30.