by a shared regional court, whose decisions are highly persuasive.
22
The more
sophisticated the institutional framework for shared decision-making about rights
and governance more generally, the greater the likelihood of cross-fertilisation of
constitutional principles and practices. Procedures for accession may provide
another catalyst for convergence, as applicant states adapt their constitutional
arrangements to meet membership criteria. Compliance may be reinforced in
other ways as well: the work of the Venice Commission in advising on questions
about democracy and human rights arising from the constitutions of the member
states of the Council of Europe is a significant case in point.^23 As the example of the
European Union shows, regional arrangements can become integrated to a point
where they are at least quasi-constitutional in character. Their impact is not
necessarily confined to the region alone, but may flow on to other states in the
zone of influence of individual members.^24
Horizontal dimensions of internationalisation
The horizontal movement of constitutional phenomena happens in many ways and
for different reasons. Most obviously, states look beyond their own borders for
solutions to common problems that seem effective and attractive. The spread of
freedom-of-information legislation; the institution of the ombudsman; proportional
electoral systems; independent election and audit commissions; and a host of other
institutions, principles and practices can be attributed to this process.
25
Equally, the
interaction of peoples is a catalyst for horizontal convergence across jurisdictional
lines.
(^26) Ideas about democracy, liberty, equality of opportunity and human rights
are disseminated naturally by these means. The globalisation of commerce, trade
constitutional law and constitutionalism in Africa’ ( 2012 ) 60 American Journal of Compara-
tive Law 439 at especially 458 – 63.
(^22) Europe: Council of Europe and the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 4 November 1950 , in force 3 September 1953 , 213 UNTS
222 ; America: Organization of American States and the American Convention on Human
Rights, San Jose ́, 22 November 1969 , in force 18 July 1978 , 1144 UNTS 123 ; Africa: African
Union and African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Nairobi, 27 June 1981 ,
entered into force 21 October 1986 , 1520 UNTS 217.
(^23) European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission),www.venice.
coe.int(viewed 6 March 2012 ).
(^24) Venice Commission members outside the Council of Europe include the Republic of
Korea, Chile, Mexico, Tunisia and Morocco. European arrangements also may indirectly
affect the public law of Commonwealth countries through the medium of the United
Kingdom.
(^25) See Yeh and Chang, ‘A decade of changing constitutionalism in Taiwan: transitional and
transnational perspectives’,Chapter 7 of this volume.
(^26) For example, domestic social movements tap into transnational networks of NGOs and
other non-state actors, to bring both domestic and international pressures to bear on state
policies: Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink,Activists beyond Borders(Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1998 ), pp. 12 – 16.