CLB versus conservative politicians: a real target of the recent
reform movementsThe significance of the recent reform movements should be examined by asking
what is the real motivation and target of these movements. Some have suggested that
conservative forces, weary with the long debate and struggle over the legitimacy of
the SDF, settled the problem through constitutional revision. In the past, attempts
to obtain the two-thirds voting majority necessary to propose a draft of an amend-
ment have failed. The Socialist Party of Japan (SPJ), which used to be the largest
opposition party and constantly suspicious of the constitutionality of the SDF, split
into the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and the Social Democratic Party of Japan
(SDPJ). The DPJ recognizes the constitutionality of the SDF and supports consti-
tutional revision. The SDPJ has also now finally recognized the constitutionality of
the SDF. As a result, almost all parties share the view that the SDF is constitutional
as the minimum self-defense force necessary. Thus, at least in politics, there is no
need to take pains to initiate the cumbersome process of constitutional revision to
confirm the constitutionality of the SDF.
The real object of the reformist movement should be the CLB’s interpretation of
Article 9 , which has set severe limits on the exercise of collective self-defense. Since the
1990 s, many conservative politicians have severely criticized the limits imposed upon
the exercise of collective self-defense by the CLB. It was the CLB’s role in the 1990 – 1
debates on the deployment of the SDF as a UN Peacekeeping Force or Operation that
frustrated conservative politicians the most. Although the ultimate passage of the Law
Concerning Co-operation with UN Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations
suggests that the CLB could not withstand pressure from politicians, the CLB, with the
help of pragmatic LDP politicians concerned about the risk of Japan being entangled
in American wars, began to impose the strict limitations on SDF deployment in
foreign countries mentioned above. But the situation seems to have since changed.
After the Gulf War in the 1990 s, pragmatist politicians gradually lost their
leadership in the LDP. Revisionists began to portray Article 9 as an obstacle to
“international co-operation” and the cause of Japan’s failure to gain respect from
the international community. They also began to attack the role of the CLB,
insisting that the recalcitrant attitude of the CLB was the best example of how
acquiescent everyone was to being ruled by bureaucrats. They complained that the
CLB should not have the authority to make constitutional interpretations that
belong primarily to the judiciary.
29
It is against this political background that we should carefully read the current
LDP draft proposal for a new constitution.
30
The new draft first retitles the second
(^29) Samuels, “Politics, security policy, and Japan’s Cabinet Legislation Bureau,” pp. 6 – 9.
(^30) On the new draft of the LDP, see Shigenori Matsui,The Constitution of Japan:
A Contextual Analysis(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011 ), pp. 270 – 1 ; Pence, “Reform in the
Rising Sun,” 377 – 81.