New Eastern Europe - November-December 2017

(Ben Green) #1
117

Great Russian Revolution

Everything used to be very simple. In Soviet times, the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union would publish an abstract for each an-
niversary: for the centenary of the birth of Lenin or for the 50th anniversary of the
revolution, for example. These abstracts, or bullet points, were what we call the
ideological programme. There is no such powerful ideological decision-making
centre in Russia today. However, there is state propaganda. As we analyse what
Russian state propaganda does, we can understand some contours, some hints of
the fact that new ideas in relation to the year 1917 have appeared in Russia.
What is interesting is that the two events of 1917 have been combined in today’s
Russian historical discourse: the February Revolution and the October coup. This
is now officially called the Great Russian Revolution of 1917. The word “great” em-
phasises the importance of these events, their significance for subsequent histo-
ry and the word “revolution” emphasises certain breaks with what existed before



  1. Yet in Soviet times the events of 1917 were discussed in the global historical
    context. It has always been said that the “Great Oc-
    tober Revolution” changed the fate of humanity and
    the mood of Soviet Messianism that was laid in the
    basis of the directives for the Sovietisation of neigh-
    bouring countries (where the capabilities of the Soviet
    Union could reach). Today, of course, the concept of revolution is a negative one.
    The Kremlin sees revolution as a destructive act. This is emphasised in all sorts of
    statements that can be heard in the media.
    Nevertheless, it cannot be said that there is no shortage of activities devoted to
    the subject of the revolution in Russia. If we look at programmes and the research
    of various universities we will see a lot of academic conferences. Interestingly, dur-
    ing these events you would be able to hear the narrative about history, the narrative
    about 1917, but there is no clear and precise concept of how to treat it today. The
    state, however, sends a clear signal: revolution is bad. In this case, the state’s sig-
    nal is much more utilitarian and aimed at current events. When we look at recent
    publications and at the movies made about the revolution we see that the issue of
    foreign intervention is overemphasised. The influence of the British forces, the Free
    Masons, and the German General staff are all present. The narrative is attached
    to some conspiratorial explanation of malicious forces trying to destroy the great
    and glorious and strong Russian Empire.
    Of course, the subject of foreign money is surprisingly relevant now. If you
    analyse the official speeches of Vladimir Putin and Sergey Lavrov (the Russian
    foreign minister) you will hear that there should be no interference in the affairs of


Today’s Kremlin
sees revolution as
a destructive act.

How Russia interprets 1917, Nikita Petrov History & Memory

Free download pdf