New Eastern Europe - November-December 2017

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Russia also knows that openly irredentist calls (“take up the flag and go for it!”)

are rarely welcome in mainstream discourse. “Soft” irredentism, however, falls on

fertile soil. Nostalgic feelings of past greatness are widespread in many Central and

Eastern European countries. A sizeable number in these states want to make their

nations “great again”. As a Pew Research Center poll from 2009 noted, revisionist

and expansionist tendencies enjoy considerable support. Sixty-six per cent of Bul-

garians, 61 per cent of Hungarians, 51 per cent of Poles and 40 per cent of Czechs

agree that parts of their respective neighbouring countries belong to them. In light

of these figures, it is no longer astonishing to know that 58 per cent of Russians

feel the same way about Crimea. In this way, the irredentism is haunting Central

Europe since Russia evoked it with the Crimean annexation.

While border revision is out of the question in mainstream discourse, politicians

do know subtle ways to manipulate voters’ emotions. János Lázár, the de facto sec-

ond most powerful man in Hungary, said in a speech that while rewriting borders

is not an option and that ethnic tensions and armed conflict should be prevented

in Europe, neighbouring countries and the West in general deserve to be blamed

for the injustice at Trianon, repeating the well-known revisionist slogan: “Justice

for Hungary!” The pro-Russian propaganda machine quickly jumped on this issue

recalling Putin’s statement on the changeableness of the Romanian-Hungarian border.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, in a speech during the summer of 2014

in Baile Tusnád, on the territory of Transylvania, vaguely referred to the historic

opportunities: “Instead of seclusion, fear and withdrawal I recommend courage,

prospective thinking, and rational but brave action to the Hungarian communi-

ties in the Carpathian Basin but also throughout the world. As anything can hap-

pen, it can easily happen that our time will come”. In his inauguration speech, two

months earlier, Orbán was even more concrete, calling for the (cultural) autonomy

of Transcarpathia – in a period when the Kremlin and its proxies did their best to

undermine the territorial integrity of Ukraine. While Orbán did not defend the

Crimean annexation (in fact he condemned the attack), it was not enough to ease

suspicions in the region. After his remarks, the Ukrainian foreign ministry sum-

moned the Hungarian ambassador.

Countering the threats

While some have argued that Crimea was the start of Russia’s neo-imperialism,

it rather proved to be a road sign in the re-establishment of Russia’s presence and

dominance in the former Soviet sphere of influence. Vladimir Putin, who has called

the breakup of the USSR the “greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century”, has

Opinion & Analysis Central Europe is more vulnerable than it appears, Péter Krekó, Edit Zgut and Lóránt Győri