32 GERALD P. FOGARTY
It was one more step in the relationship that the premier was de-
veloping with the pope.
The Russian decision, however, did not sit well with other
branches of the Orthodox Church. The Greek primate condemned
the Russians for breaking the unity of the Orthodox Church.9
Athenagoras, who had been most open to sending delegates, was
apparently caught off guard. Given the Rhodes call for Orthodox
unity in opposing any delegates, his synod announced that it
would not be represented at the Council.10
When the Council opened, Russian Orthodox observers were
present, while, among others, Metropolitan Josyf Slipyj of the
Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church remained a prisoner of the
Soviet Union. Sentenced in 1945 to confinement, Slipyj, after
serving his sentence, found himself exiled indefinitely to Sibe-
ria; there, too, he was unable to carry out his pastoral duties. The
irony was not lost on the Ukrainian bishops from the diaspora
outside Ukraine—including the United States. The public protest
against this situation later caused the Vatican some difficulties.
In 1960, John XXIII had named Slipyj a cardinal in pectore; in oth-
er words, his name was not published at that time. But the pope
wanted to do more. Through an intermediary, he had Togliatti,
the secretary of the Italian Communist Party, broach the ques-
tion of Slipyj’s release with Khrushchev at a Moscow meeting of
Communist Party leaders. The premier, however, turned a deaf
ear to the proposal.11 Paradoxically, what ultimately brought the
release of Slipyj was an event that almost led to nuclear war.
For some months before the Council opened, the Soviets had
been stationing fighter planes in Cuba. On October 18, a U.S.
Navy fighter squadron had been moved to the southern part of
- New York Times, October 13, 1962.
- Stransky, “Foundation of the Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity,”
73–80. - Riccardi, Il Vaticano e Mosca, 238–41; Hebblethwaite, Pope John XXIII, 467.