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rights,as definedby the U.S.FoundingFathersandLocke’s otherphilosophicdescen-
dents,werethe sameas whathe consideredcivilliberty.In an 1887articleentitled“Some
NaturalRights,” he grumbles,“The eighteenth-centurynotionof ‘naturalrights,’ or of the
‘rightsof man,’ was a revoltagainstthe notionthat a manhad nothingand was entitledto
nothinguntilsomeothermenhad givenhimsomerightshere.The rightsof manmeant
thata man,as a man,enteredhumansociety,not underservitudeand constraintto other
men,or to socialtraditions,but undera presumptionof non-servitudeand non-obligation
to othermen,or to socialorganization.Naturalrights... meantthatthe fundamental
presumptionmustbe changed,and thateverymanmust,in the viewof socialorderand
obligation,be regardedas freeandindependent,untilsomenecessityhadbeenestab-
lishedfor restraininghim,insteadof beingheldto be in completesubjectionto social
bonds,untilhe couldprovidethatsomeestablishedauthorityhademancipatedhim.
Whenso regarded,it is evidentthatthe notionof naturalrightsis one of greatvalueand
importance.”^110
Howcan one reconcilethat admissionwithSumner’s generalhostilityto the principles
of individualrights?In that samearticleSumnercontinuesfollowingthe Hume-ishSkep-
tic partlyline by assertingthatLockeanrightsare groundless,andthatWesternerscon-
ceivedof themfor the solereasonthattheyservesomefleetingmomentaryexpediency,
just as worshipingtotemsmighthaveonceservedtribalsocieties.The Yalescholarthere-
forecontestsa “notion” thatwouldlaterbe championedby RobertNozickandother
Kant-influencedlibertarianswhopresumemoralityto be basedon context-free,uncondi-
tional,inherentlygoodstricturesthatdo not pertainto servinghumanlife—“thatrights
haveindependentauthorityin absoluteright,so thattheyare not relativeor contingent,
but absolute.”^111 As statedthroughoutthis trilogythat you are reading,Sumneris correct
that individualrightsneednot be of paranormalorigin,and that theyare not the context-
lessCategoricalImperativesthatKantpresumeseverymoralprincipleto be. Sumner
sagelycontendsthatif rightsare the resultof Kantiancommandmentsthatmustbe
followedunconditionally,absentof anyregardfor howtheyaffectanybody’s life or
interests,rightsbecome“arbitrarydogmatism,andemptydeclamation.” It is at that
point,impartsSumner,that governistsare grantedthe opportunityto redefineindividual
rightsto includethe NewDealers’ “right” to receivegoodsand servicesthatthe govern-
mentobtainedby forciblyexpropriatingthe rich.“It has becomeoneof the favorite
methodsof modernschemers,whentheyfindit difficultto providemeansby whichmen
mayget whattheyneedin orderto enjoyearthlycomfort,to put all thosenecessary
thingsamong‘naturalrights.’... It is the dutyof the stateto securenaturalrights.
Therefore,if thereis anythingwhicha manwants,he is entitledto haveit so longas there
is any of it.”^112
Expectedly,Sumnererrs just as muchas Nozickwhenhe leapsto the falseconclusion
thatif individualLockeanrightsare not context-less,intrinsic,platonicabsolutes,they
mustbe inherentlywhimsicaldelusionsof a still-primitiveWesternsociety.In keeping
withthe Hume-ishSkeptics’ notionthatany moralprecept—includingrights—is malle-
ableif not illusory,Sumneropinesthat one should“thinkof rightsas rulesof the gameof
socialcompetitionwhichare currentnowand here.Theyare not absolute.... Theymust
be enjoyedunderexistingcircumstances,thatis, subjectto limitationsof tradition,cus-
tom,andfact.”^113 As establishedinThe Freedomof PeacefulAction, the existenceof night-
watchman-staterightsarecontingentuponthe actionsof humanbeings,but that doesnot
precludethemfrombeingobjective,contextualabsolutes.Whatrendersthemobjective,
context-ladenabsolutesis thattheyare the logicalcorollariesof objectivelydiscernible
aspectsof the humanspecies’ ontologicalnature.As muchas Sumnergoesalongwith
Humein denyingthatoughtcomesfromis, the scienceof politicalphilosophyremains
inextricablefromethics.Thisis why,subsequentto denyingthe applicabilityofoughtto