The Ethologists’ UnpaidDebtsto Spencerand Sumner 289his ownstudyof politicsand economics,Sumnerinadvertentlysmugglesoughtand ethics
backinto his writings.
The consequenceof this is that Sumnerdeliversendlessproclamationsaboutwhatthe
governmentoughtto do, or on whyactivistsandbusinesspeopleshouldor shouldnot
engagein somespecificactivities.WhenSumnerdoesthis,he doesit withthe utmost
certaintyin his moralconvictions—the samemoralcertaintythathe criticizeswhenhe
spotsit in otherwriters.Thisexplainsthe morallyrighteoustonefoundin muchof
Sumner’s works,suchas in his diatribesagainstWesternimperialism.Hencethe former
priestrationalizesthishypocriticalmoralizingby claimingthat,thoughhis defenseof
civillibertyand the Ruleof Peaceare morallyright,his moralrightness,too, stemsmerely
fromthe malleablesocialmores.“Civillibertyis really... not a matterof resolutions,or
‘declarations’”— Sumnermeansthe Declarationof Independence,as it stressesabsolute
rights—as the U.S.FoundingFathersandotherEnlightenmentphilosophes“seemedto
think” in the 1700s.^114 Sumnerresultantlydeduces,“Civilliberty” must“be an affairof
positivelaw,of institutions,andof history.It variesfromtimeto time,for the notionof
rightsis constantlyin flux.”^115 In a toneof sheerabsolutism,Sumnerpraiseshis own
worldviewfor being“hostileto absolutism.. .”^116 WhatSumneroverlooksis thatthe
sameargumenthe advancedagainstthe validityof naturalrightscan be thrownbackat
him in rebuttalto his ownmoralargumentfor “civilliberty.”
ConsiderthatSumnerimplicitlycapitulatesthatthe laissez-faire,anti-spoliation“civil
liberty” he defendshas no objectivefoundation,but is an emptyabstractionformulated
fromthe majorityof citizensin Sumner’s ownsociety.Shouldone followthatlogic,then
Sumnerhas to relinquishhis ownconceptof “civilliberty” whenAmerica’s mostpromi-
nentcommunityleaderschoseto redefinethatphrasearbitrarily.Thesamegovernists
whoco-optedthe termrightsin Sumner’s lifetimehavealsoco-optedcivilliberties. Just as
theyhad redefined“propertyrights” as a derelict’s “right” to havethe governmentpro-
videhimcashit extortedfromsomebodyelse,so too havetheylacedcivillibertieswitha
similarmeaning.Thisexplainswhy,as we discussedin chapter8, the ACLUgetsaway
witharguingthat a low-incomeartisthas a “right” to demandthat the governmentmulct
moneyfromwealthiercitizensand thenbankrollor purchasehis artwork.It alsoexplains
why,whensomeLockean-sympathizingpoliticianseeksto reducetaxpayerfinancingof
suchartists,the ACLUsquealsthatthisis a violationof the artist’s civilliberties.To
countlesslawyersassociatedwiththis organization,civillibertiesincludean artist’s enti-
tlementto capitalthatwasextractedfromotherhumanbeingsat gunpoint.Sumner
wouldhaveprotestedthe late twentieth-century’s government-fundedartsprogramsif
he hadbeenaroundto hearof them,but he wouldnot havehada crediblegrievance
againstthem.He alreadyconcededthattruemoralitywassubjectivelyandcapriciously
determinedby the majorityopinionof his society,andmajorityopinionhas oftencome
on the sideof the ACLUwheneversucha controversyerupts.It is not crediblefor Sumner
to maintainthatindividualsshouldsanctionthe freemarketon the basisthatthe free
marketis whatthe majorityof Westernerswantedin his ownday.Indeed,the free market
is not as widelyreveredby the majorityin my ownera, as I typethesewords.Sumner’s
positionhas no morecredibilitythandoesa RobertNozick-influencedlibertarianwhen
he argues,quitecontraryto Sumner,thatindividualsshouldacceptthatcapitalism’s
greatnessis intrinsicand requiresno inductive,objectiveexplanation.
TheYalesociologistcouldhaveavoidedthis intellectualimplosionhadhe admitted
thatindividualrightsandcivillibertyare the same.Anotheraspectof avoidingthat
error—a still-more-importantaspect—wouldinvolvethe admissionthatrightsandcivil
libertyare contextuallyabsolutemoralprinciplesthat formednot fromsocietalconsensus
but fromscientificallyobservablefactsof man’s natureas a rational,volitionalbeing.For
thesereasons,I cannotquibblewithPeikoff’s ultimatelybleakassessmentthatSumner