Asia Looks Seaward

with Dalian and Tianjin as the main ports. The second lies near the Shanghai

area, with Ningbo as the primary port. The third is in the south, with Guang-

zhou as the main VLCC-capable port. Connecting these zones with users

throughout the country has become a major priority for Beijing.

Can a National Tanker Fleet Ensure Oil Security?

As noted previously, China is strengthening its oil transportation capacity in a

bid to ensure uninterrupted oil deliveries in times of crisis. But there are no guar-

antees. First, a national tanker fleet cannot protect oil importers from the internal

security problems endemic to many oil-exporting countries. Civil war, terrorism,

or many other factors could prevent supplies from ever reaching Chinese tankers.

Second, instability in producing countries generally does not affect oil shipments

once they get offshore, but many Chinese analysts fear that the U.S. Navy and

allied navies will blockade energy shipments to China in a showdown over

Taiwan or some other crisis.^28 Chinese ‘‘hawks’’ believe the PLAN must modern-

ize because its ability to secure vital SLOCs and ensure the safety of China-bound

shipments ‘‘seriously lags’’ behind China’s growing import demand.^29 In their

view, a national tanker fleet would bolster the security of the nation’s oil supply

if PLA Navy units escorted Chinese tankers through contested areas.

Some Chinese analysts nonetheless believe that Chinese-operated tankers can

secure oil shipments from unstable areas such as Africa and the Middle East.^30

While internal problems in the supplier country may be unavoidable, the ration-

ale behind these analysts’ view seems to be that an importer with its own fleet

enjoys greater ability to ensure energy security once the oil leaves the exporting

country. Protecting tankers and downstream infrastructure (refineries and distri-

bution networks) is usually simpler than trying to protect oil fields in distant

countries jealous of their sovereignty. Protecting an oil or gas field in a country

thousands of miles away would entail a large, rapid joint military deployment

that is beyond the capability of nearly all oil importers other than the United

States.And,evenifanimporterboastssubstantialforceprojectionability,its

response would likely come too late to prevent a supply cutoff.

Tanker Protection Options

Efforts to protect tankers fall into two primary categories. The first is convoying

and escorting tankers. Shippers resist convoy operations because it hinders their

flexibility and adds costs. Naval officers also tend to dislike escort missions,

which cede the initiative almost entirely to the enemy while providing little

opportunity for glory. Convoy duty, moreover, is highly asset-intensive, particu-

larly in a threat environment characterized by possible aerial, surface, and subsur-

face threats. A simple calculation quickly reveals that convoying would stretch

China’s navy very thin, as the PLAN currently possesses far fewer modern

120 Asia Looks Seaward