both land- and seaborne. India’s history and geography have focused attention
primarily on land, but the nation’s lengthy coastline and increasing maritime
traffic and trade should call attention to the seaward approaches.
India’s third national security objective—protecting the country from instabil-
ity, radicalism, and extremism emanating from neighboring states—appears
more suited to nonmilitary tools of power, with the possible exception of the
border security function mentioned above. Border security involves ideas and
information as much as it does a physical attack demanding military or law-
enforcement action.
The fourth national security objective—securing the country against the threat
or use of WMD (weapons of mass destruction)—is a more defensive, narrower
construction of the second national security objective. It involves WMD, not just
nuclear weapons, and the ‘‘securing’’ language carries defensive connotations.
It also envisions defending the country, a physically confined area, rather than
citizens and property, which could beanywhere in the world. Securing the
country against the use or threat of nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological
weaponry could involve direct defenses such as missile defenses or protective
gear. Very little of this is specifically maritime in character. But the capacity to
interdict sea-based platforms used to deliver WMD—submarines, specifically—
would require seagoing capabilities.
The fifth national security objective—development of an indigenous defense
research, development and productionbase, among other things to overcome
restrictions on international transfers of defense items—has a direct maritime
component, as much of the IN is foreign built and supplied. This objective is less
about how India will advance its national security than about how it will do so
differently in the future.
The next national security objective—promoting further cooperation and
understanding with neighboring countries, and implementing mutually agreed
confidence-building measures—can be seen more as a way to achieve security
than as an end in itself. Regardless, maritime forces can contribute significantly
to this objective. Cooperation between maritime forces (both naval and law
enforcement) on common issues of security, safety, and stewardship has a long his-
tory and is often possible with fewer political overtones or concerns. Cooperative
measures, humanitarian and disaster-relief missions, and even port visits can build
understanding, confidence, and generally good-neighborly relations.
The final Indian national security objective—pursuing security and strategic
dialogues with major powers and key partners—again appears to be more of a
means to an end.^7 Maritime forces can play an indirect role in achieving this
goal. Security dialogues can certainly include or even revolve around discussions
of maritime issues, which are often easier to address first in efforts to improve an
overall relationship. The 1972 Incidents at Sea, or INCSEA, agreement between
the United States and the Soviet Union stands out among such initiatives. In and128 Asia Looks Seaward