from their torpedo tubes. It is unclear, however, whether either missile is suitable
for delivering nuclear payloads: their range is limited, and it remains dubious
whether India has the ability to miniaturize a nuclear weapon sufficiently to
mount on either of them. Similarly, India’s Russian-builtKilo-class submarines,
which are being refitted to carry the Klub and the indigenous Brahmos missile,
could conceivably provide an interim nuclear platform. Again, however, it is
unclear whether the Klub and the Brahmos boast either the range or the ability
to carry a nuclear warhead. Nor is it clear whether diesel submarines have the
range, endurance, and survivability necessary to mount a serious deterrent effort.
India’s other short- to medium-term option is to mount nuclear delivery
systems on surface ships. The IN has test-launched a naval version (Dhanush)
of the army’s short-range Prithvi ballistic missile from a ship on two occasions.^31
The issues raised by this ungainly platform/delivery-vehicle combination
are fairly obvious. First, the Dhanush has a range of only 250–350 kilometers,
meaning that the launch platform would be extremely vulnerable to conventional
counterstrikes by an opponent. Second, surface vessels, even modern ones with
stealth characteristics, are nowhere near as survivable as submarines—impairing
their credibility as a deterrent. Finally, the safety issues associated with launching
liquid-fueled missiles on the high seas, particularly during heavy weather, remain
to be determined.
Even if it can speedily resolve the engineering woes its submarine reactor
project has encountered, India will still face the question of developing a weapon
system with the right technical characteristics and enough destructive potential to
pose a credible deterrent. Some of the ASCMs mentioned above could be modi-
fied for nuclear strike missiles, but ideally India wants a SLBM (submarine-
launched ballistic missile). While reporting is scanty, it is reasonable to assume
that DRDO, which has spearheaded the research and development effort
vis-a`-vis ballistic missiles, is heading up such a project. The secrecy shrouding
weaponsprogramspreventsoutsidersfromgaugingDRDO’sprogress.Past
problems with systems such as the land-based Agni missile, however, suggest that
technical challenges will keep the SLBM initiative from reaching fruition for a
decade or more.
The range of a future SLBM is critical if the maritime leg of India’s strategic
triad is to be an effective part of nuclear deterrence. While some Indian analysts
argue that New Delhi needs intercontinental-range missiles to deter the United
States, allowing the nation to pursue a truly unfettered foreign and security
policy, Pakistan and China provide a more realistic pair of drivers for Indian
deterrence parameters.^32 To deter Pakistan, an Indian SLBM could have a range
of less than 1,000 kilometers, assuming that India would want its submarines to
be able to patrol and fire from standoff distances from the Pakistani coast.
In the case of China, India has two choices, each of which poses its own
difficulties. First, if the goal of an Indian maritime deterrent is to reach Chinese138 Asia Looks Seaward