As is fairly typical in Indian strategic discourse, a retired senior officer has
dropped additional hints at the direction of India’s sea-based nuclear force. The
officer in question, retired Admiral Arun Prakash, is conversant with the facts.
He has stated explicitly that ‘‘development work is reported to be under way,’’
deftly reporting the existence of a program without running afoul of laws forbid-
ding the disclosure of classified material. Admiral Prakash also contended that
India ‘‘must have a small number of SSBNs,’’ or nuclear-powered ballistic-
missile submarines—thereby revealing his personal preference for platform and
weapon type. In the same interview, finally, he hinted about possible deployment
patterns for such a weapon system: ‘‘When this platform becomes operationally
available, we will need suitable areas in the distant reaches of the Indian Ocean
from where it can be safely deployed to pose deterrence to our adversaries.’’^25
The reason for this relative lack of public discussion of a submarine-based
nuclear deterrent may have to do with the difficulties India has encountered so
far in this endeavor and some of the regional consequences of this capability once
it is at sea. A maritime nuclear capability can take a number of forms, namely
surface ships, naval aircraft, or submarines armed with ballistic missiles, cruise
missiles, or gravity bombs. But, as Admiral Prakash averred, the mix of platform
and weapon system most likely to produce the survivable second-strike capability
India appears to desire is a nuclear-powered submarine equipped with
ballistic missiles. Over the past twenty years, India has taken halting steps toward
acquiring its own nuclear-powered submarine and developing ballistic
missiles capable of being fired from submarines. In 1988, India leased a Soviet
Charlie I-class nuclear attack submarine as part of a program to develop an
Indian-manufactured nuclear reactor suitable for submarine propulsion.
The leasing experiment was not renewed, although recent reports indicate that
India may try again in a bid to move its indigenous reactor program ahead.
This program, called the ATV (Advanced Technology Vehicle), has made halt-
ing progress over the years. Until early 2006, indications were that the ATV had
not advanced beyond land-based testing of a prototype reactor.^26 Recent reports,
however, indicate that the reactor has successfully been tested. One report in late
2006 declared that the system was ‘‘fully online.’’^27 Although some analysts had
estimatedthatanuclear-poweredsubmarinewouldbedeployedasearlyas
2007, this was very optimistic.^28 The latest estimates show the system achieving
initial operating capability around 2012, and this is likely optimistic as well.^29
Now pending, India’s acquisition of six French-designedScorpenediesel-
electric submarines could supply a substitute platform, allowing New Delhi to
put to sea a nuclear deterrent force at an early date. This too would raise some
operational issues.^30 For one, what weapon system would conventional subma-
rinescarry?TheScorpenewas not designed to house massive ballistic missiles,
and whether it could be retrofitted is doubtful.Scorpenes are capable of launching
3M-54E Klub ASCMs (antiship cruise missiles), as well as French-built Exocets,
India as a Maritime Power? 137