soil, the navy could accept ballistic missiles with shorter ranges—that is, missiles
that are less challenging to develop and build—and occasionally send its
SSBNs on patrol in the SCS (South China Sea). The downsides of such deploy-
ments are twofold. On the political side, deployments of nuclear-powered,
nuclear-armed submarines to the SCS could be politically objectionable to
littoral states, particularly in Southeast Asia, where India is trying to forge
stronger defense relations. Japan’s ‘‘nuclear allergy,’’ moreover, could be aggra-
vated by such deployments. If so, this would undercut New Delhi’s effort to
improve relations with this Asian giant, countering Chinese influence and naval
power. On the operational side, vesselstransiting the Strait of Malacca and
patrolling the SCS would be subject to detection, leaving them more vulnerable
than they would be in the Indian Ocean. This would permit China to bring
substantial ASW (antisubmarine-warfare) and detection assets to bear in what
Beijing considers ‘‘home’’ waters. India’s second option—to develop and
deploy an SLBM with a range on the order of 3,000 km—is more challenging
from a technical standpoint. To date,India has yet to successfully test or
deploy a land-based ballistic missile with this range, although it is making
significant progress on space launch vehicles, which are close cousins to ballistic
missiles.
Regardless of which option it picks, India cannot develop a maritime nuclear
deterrent force in a vacuum. Other Asian actors will watch, then react politically
and militarily. Pakistan can be expected to enhance its ASW capabilities and to
patrol Indian Ocean waters more aggressively, signaling that it has the capacity
to threaten Indian deterrent forces regardless of how they deploy. China may
opt to deploy its own SSBNs to the Indian Ocean and perhaps, over time, begin
dispatching ASW-capable units to the region more frequently and more aggres-
sively. Japan must determine whether its concern over nuclear issues outweighs
its desire to improve military and security relations with India as a hedge against
China’s rise. The deployment of an Indian nuclear force to sea will have an
impact on the strategic calculations of all Asian maritime powers, even though
such a deployment is likely years away.
Economic and Energy SecurityAgain, the roles India chooses to emphasize for its naval forces and the capabil-
ities the IN develops to fulfill these roles will have profound effects on the other
Asian powers—particularly China and Japan, which also worry about the secu-
rity of their maritime trade and their seaborne energy supplies. Some geographic
scoping is required to assess India’s economic and energy security and its
maritime power with sufficient rigor. Though an operational and tactical
publication rather than an effort to define the strategic realm, the 2004Indian
Maritime Doctrinestatement proclaims that the ‘‘Indian maritime vision for the
India as a Maritime Power? 139