Qin Xiao, ‘‘China’s Energy Security Strategy and the Energy Transport Problem’’
[Zhongguo Nengyuan Anquan Zhanlue Zhong de Nengyuan Yunshu Wenti],China Energy
[Zhonguo Nengyuan] 26, no. 7 (July 2004): 4–7.
‘‘China Urged to Beef Up Ocean Oil Shipping,’’Asia Pulse,March 15, 2006, Lexis-
Nexis, http://web.lexis-nexis.com. The tonnage figure cited here is significant in absolute
terms, but reassigning these vessels to domestic firms would not help China’s long-distance
oil transport situation: few of these ships are the VLCCs needed to bring crude from the
Middle East, Africa, and other distant locales.
Erica Downs, ‘‘The Chinese Energy Security Debate,’’China Quarterly177 (March
2004): 21–41.
Ren Xiaoyu, ‘‘Analysis and Opinions onHow PetroChina Markets its Equity Oil,’’
China Oil and Gas4 (2002): 50–52.
Yang,Sea Lane Security and International Cooperation,123.
Zheng Changxing, ‘‘2005 China Shipbuilding Industry Development Characteristics,’’
Mechanical and Electrical Equipment2 (2006): 33–34.
Qin, ‘‘China’s Energy Security Strategy and the Energy Transport Problem.’’
‘‘Major Chinese Operator Calls for Maritime Oil Transport Development,’’ BBC,
March 10, 2006, Lexis-Nexis, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.
Yang,Sea Lane Security and International Cooperation,124.
Ibid., 123.
‘‘By Year End 2010, the Length of China’s Oil Pipeline Network Will Grow by 25,000
KM,’’Oil and Capital(in Russian), February 26, 2007, http://www.oilcapital.ru/print/news/2007/
02/261024_105757.shtml.
Zha Daojiong, ‘‘Three Questions About China’s Future Oil Security’’ [Sanwen
Zhongguo Weilai Shiyou Anquan],China Petroleum Enterprise[Zhongguo Shiyou Qiye].
Also see Zhang Wenmu, ‘‘China’s Energy Security and Policy Choices’’ [Zhongguo
Nengyuan Anquan yu Zhengce Xuanze],World Economics and International Politics5 (2003):
11–16.
Zhang, ‘‘China’s Energy Security and Policy Choices,’’ 11–16.
Qin, ‘‘China’s Energy Security Strategy and the Energy Transport Problem,’’ 4–7.
In 2002, Chinese tankers carried less than 4 percent of China-bound cargoes from the Middle
East, none at all from West Africa.
This rough calculation assumes that Chinese seaborne oil import demand of approxi-
mately 3.3 million barrels per day would require two VLCCs/day to off-load in China. Thus,
if one warship guarded a two-tanker group, the thirty-five-day round-trip between China and
theGulfwouldrequirethirty-fiveescortsinactive service. (Chinese-flagged ships would be
vulnerable traveling both to and from the Gulf, since they would be clearly marked as being
in Chinese service). Assuming a 1-1 backup ratio, plus logistics vessels for refueling on the
in- and outbound legs of the voyage, the PLAN would require upward of seventy highly
modern ships to conduct such an operation. As Chinese information, surveillance, and recon-
naissance improves, more focused operations to sanitize suspected subsurface and surface
threat zones may become thinkable. Nonetheless, convoy operations would be highly asset-
intensive while imposing high opportunity costs. Warships diverted to convoy duty would
have to forego operations more directly related to the crisis that triggered the need for escorts
in the first place. Counterblockade efforts would also suffer from the PLAN’s lack of at-sea
replenishment ships.
Yang,Sea Lane Security and International Cooperation,119.
