concern over Asia, where its determination to maintain an independent China
ran afoul of Japanese naval modernization and belligerence. American attempts
to negotiate with Japan lasted literally up to the minute of that nation’s surprise
attack on the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.
The interwar period saw continued Japanese assaults on the integrity of China
and Southeast Asia, accompanied by the growth and modernization of a power-
ful IJN. Meanwhile, the foreign naval presence in East Asia—both afloat
and ashore—decreased as the result of the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Treaty,^18
the Washington Conference’s Five-Power Treaty, and the effects of the global
depression that struck the United States in the fall of 1929.
In this environment, the U.S. presence in Asia was supported by a Mahanian
‘‘big navy’’ strategy that lacked the necessary naval forces to carry it out.
American possessions and interests were vulnerable to mounting Japanese naval
dominance.
ThevoyageoftheGreatWhiteFleethadannouncedthecoming-of-age
of American naval power in Asian waters, but by the 1930s, that power was
represented only by the small, weak Asiatic Fleet. This force included no
capital ships. It was usually composed of a squadron of destroyers, a squadron
of submarines, a dozen or so gunboats patrolling China’s rivers, and a single
obsolete cruiser.^19 The U.S. Navy was organized around just one major battle
fleet that before 1940 was usually stationed in the Atlantic.
Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, East Asian waters were
dominated first by the navies of Great Britain and Japan, and then by that of
the United States. The British presence was markedly reduced following the
signing of the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Naval Treaty, and was further minimized
through the naval limitations agreements signed in Washington in 1921–22.
The U.S. naval presence was limited by the Washington treaties, but the
Root-Takahira and Taft-Katsura codicils between the United States and Japan
also limited the American naval presence in Asia, as Washington tried to
buy Japan’s acquiescence in U.S. possession of the Philippines and other Pacific
territories by agreeing to turn a blind eye to Tokyo’s depredations in Korea and
China. Diplomacy in this era attempted to substitute for effective strategy and
naval strength, and it failed.
World War II
This failure became evident in 1941. Japan judged that its strategic require-
ments, particularly access to raw materials, and a determination to dominate
the Asian mainland could best be achieved by destroying American naval power
in the region. Rarely has a nation made a more self-defeating strategic decision.
The U.S. maritime strategy developed under War Plan Orange preparatory to
World War II was effectively carried out in the Pacific after 1941, although the
Clipper Ships to Carriers 55