Particularly uncertain is the extent to which China will seek to project power
beyond its shores. Will China seek ‘‘command of the sea’’? If so, what will be
the essence and implications of ‘‘command of the sea with Chinese characteris-
tics’’? In short, can China become a true maritime power?
This chapter, which selectively surveys aspects of China’s naval development in
order to elucidate the trajectory of its growing sea power, will proceed in seven
steps. A section on latest developments and assessments will survey China’s
2006 Defense White Paper Summary and the 2006 U.S. Department of Defense
report on China’s military modernization. The next section, on force structure,
will examine China’s military budget; submarine force; MIW (mine-warfare)
capabilities; surface ships; amphibious forces; naval air force; command, control,
communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(C4ISR) capabilities; and deck aviation ambitions. Subsequent sections will con-
sider China’s base infrastructure, training, and doctrine. Inferences about China’s
naval modernization plan will then be offered, followed byimplications for
regional naval relations and an overall assessment.
Latest Developments and Assessments
China’s maritime potential is clearly being debated in Beijing. A remarkable
Chinese government study entitledThe Rise of Great Powersattempts to deter-
mine the reasons why nine nations became great powers. Conceived on Novem-
ber 24, 2003 at a Communist Party of China Central Committee Political
Bureau group session and completed in 2006, it draws on the analyses of many
top Chinese scholars.The Rise of Great Powerssuggests that national power stems
from economic development, which is fueled by foreign trade and in turn can be
furthered by a strong navy. This latter connection is emphasized by Senior
Captain Liu Yijian of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN or PLA Navy).
Writing in China’s foremost military journal,China Military Science,Liu states
that ‘‘Possession of a big and powerful naval force [is] of great strategic impor-
tance in defending national security, promoting a nation’s economic develop-
ment, and maintaining a nation’s international standing.’’^2
PLAN Senior Captain Xu Qi builds on this theme, emphasizing that ‘‘China’s
...maritime geostrategic relationships...are undergoing profound change....
China’s navy must make [important] strategic choices.’’^3 For Xu, China’s strategic
future lies at sea. China, with its ‘‘very long shoreline, numerous islands, vast
administered sea areas, and abundant ocean resources,’’ is naturally a great mari-
time power. The nation’s ‘‘coastal seas and continental-shelf areas [combine to]
approach 273 million hectares,’’ he points out. ‘‘This area is more than two times
that of China’s total arable land.’’ For China, with ‘‘the world’s largest population
and relatively deficient resources,’’ the sea can thus ‘‘serve as a strategic resource
replacement area.’’ Rather than envisioning enduring Chinese vulnerability at
Can China Become a Maritime Power? 71