stated thatKitty HawkhadfailedtodetecttheChinesesubmarine.^10 While
the specifics of this incident remain unclear, at a minimum it highlighted the
inherent difficulty in detecting a diesel submarine.
These Chinese naval developments took on larger strategic significance on
January 11, 2007, when China reportedly demonstrated a direct-ascent antisatel-
lite capability. A mobile, solid-fueledKaituozhe-1space launch vehicle, probably
launched from Xichang Launch Center in Sichuan province, lofted a kinetic
kill payload into low-earth orbit aboard a ballistic missile in order to physically
destroy one of its (aging) weather satellites,Feng Yun 1C,at an altitude of approx-
imately 865 kilometers.^11 Only hours before, Lieutenant General Michael
Maples, director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, had told the Senate
Intelligence Committee that ‘‘Russia and China continue to be the primary states
of concern regarding military space and counterspace programs.’’ Several months
before, Dr. Donald Kerr, director of the National Reconnaissance Office, had con-
firmed that a Chinese ground-based high-energy laser had ‘‘illuminated’’ a U.S.
satellite in low-earth orbit without interfering with the satellite’s operations.^12
Taken together, these events suggestthat, just as Beijing is determined to
prevent the United States and other foreign powers from dominating China’s
maritime periphery, it will also maintain a strategic stake in the aerospace dimen-
sion that is so critical to modern maritime power projection. As James Holmes
points out, ‘‘Beijing regards the seas and skies adjacent to China’s coasts as a
‘commons’ through which commerce, shipments of raw materials and military
power can flow freely. A rising China is increasingly reluctant to entrust the secu-
rity of this commons to uncertain U.S. goodwill.’’^13 Senior Captain Xu offers a
naval context for this event: ‘‘Outer space...has become China’s strategic interest
and new ‘high ground.’...[This] is beneficial for enhancing the information
strength to safeguard our sea power.’’^14 Senior Captain Liu Yijian adds, ‘‘the
struggle to seize space superiority will directly affect the course and structure of
maritime combat operations, and it will inevitably have a huge influence on the
struggle for command of the sea in the future.’’^15
White Paper Summary
China’s 2006 Defense White Paper states that China’s ‘‘overall national strength
has considerably increased.’’ It supports Hu’s call for naval development, stating
that China’s navy ‘‘aims at gradual extension of the strategic depth for offshore
defensive operations and enhancing its capabilities in integrated maritime opera-
tions and nuclear counterattacks.’’ The White Paper further declares that China’s
Navy is working to build itself into a modern maritime force...consisting of combined
arms with both nuclear and conventional means of operations. Taking informationiza-
tion as the goal and strategic focus in its modernization drive, the Navy gives high prior-
ity to the development of maritime information systems, and new-generation weaponryCan China Become a Maritime Power? 73