would choose exile, they were disappointed.^44 Eventually he proposes a fine that his friends might
pay, which he could have proposed at the outset.
Socrates’remarks after sentencing, though not particularly comical, do put some of his previous
statements in a different light. His opening words here (38c–e) make it evident that he was familiar
with court procedures, thus indicating he was lying in his initial opening remarks to the jury (17d).
Whenhe delivers his oracular remarks to his condemners, he says he will be avenged by his younger
and harsher followers (39d), which contrasts with what he said earlier (30e), when he remarked that
if the Athenians got rid of him they would have trouble finding another. Now they won’t.
Turning to the men who voted for his acquittal, whom he calls judges, he says he would be
pleased to converse with them about what has happened, but there is no time. Nothing, however,
prevents him from telling stories about how things turned out. Specifically, Socrates says that his
daimonion, which even in small things opposed him if he were about to do something improper, did
not oppose him concerning this action, so at this time, his dying must be a good thing. In the second
half of this speech to the acquitters, Socrates remarks that, independent of thedaimonion, there are
stories, which he proceeds to recount, that give us great hope that death is good. And more
specifically it is clear to Socrates now that it is better for him to be dead and“released from troubles”
(41d). That is, now, when Socrates is already old, the effect of the Oracle, which earlier in his life–
though how much earlier is not clear–had endangered Socrates, is now in harmony with the
restraining effect of thedaimonion.
His parting words to those who voted to convict him, men who had probably left the court
anyway, is both a parting joke and an insult. They made a mistake by trying to harm Socrates and
deserve to be condemned, which is a straightforward insult. Then, however, he names his con-
demners as his spiritual heirs, begging them to punish and pain his sons as Socrates had pained the
Athenians if they seem to care for money or anything else more than virtue or if they gain a
reputation for something when they are worth nothing.“If you do these things,”Socrates says,
“both I and my sons will have been treated justly by you”(42a). That is, Socrates seems to praise the
Athenians by expecting them to improve his sons by paining them the way he has improved the
Athenians by paining them. And we know how well that has worked.^45 His final words repeat an
argument made previously, that it is unreasonable to fear death:“Now it is time to go away, I to die,
you to live. Which of us goes to a better business is unclear to everyone but the god.”And how
would the jury have received that?
Conclusion
One conclusion from the foregoing analysis seems clear:“TheApology, though dealing with a very
serious situation, strikes constantly the note of comedy.”Even more: if comedy focuses chiefly on
the exposure of vanity and pretention, when undertaken“at the behest of a god: surely this is piety!
The unpopularity of Socrates arises from the fact that the public has no sense of humor.”^46 Such a
conclusion raises an obvious question. Granted that the text shows how Socrates makes fun of, and
thereby offends, the Athenians, the big question remains: why? The answer to this problem may
require a perspective beyond the text.
In this context, consider an argument of Voegelin. For him the conflict between the philosopher
and the non-philosophers was a particular expression of the“tension of order and passion”that in
Athens had once been mastered by the public cult of tragedy. The conflict between Socrates and the
Athenians, however, made that cult
senseless because from now on tragedy had only one subject matter, the fate of Socrates.
Insofar as the Platonic dialog was animated by the tension between Socrates and Athens, it was
in the history of Hellenic symbolic forms the successor to Aeschylean tragedy under new
political conditions.^47Socratic Method and Existence 27